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Introduction
With all the talk of "structural reform," is Japan really changing? In particular, is its system of corporate governance becoming one based more on
legal rules and rights than on informal relationships? Commentators on
comparative corporate law have constructed a familiar model of Japanese
corporate governance based on informal relationships such as internal
monitoring by main banks, keiretsu and lifetime employment. Corollaries
to this view include insider-dominated boards with no supervisory function over management and informal consultations with powerful government bureaucrats rather than compliance with legal regulations. This
model implicitly assumes a strong culturally based preference in Japan for
informality over law-a proposition that persists despite criticisms from
Japanese law specialists that it is oversimplified and exaggerated. The
model also leads to skepticism about the possibility of change in Japan. Is
all the talk of reform exaggerated and unlikely to have a real impact on
corporate governance? Or is the dominant model of Japanese corporate
governance now overdue for reevaluation in light of changes sweeping
Japan similar to those experienced in the U.S. in the 1980s? If there has
been real change, where are the "real cases" which evidence it?
This Article contributes to this ongoing debate on the role of law in
Japanese corporate governance by examining the effects of derivative litigation in Japan. Specifically, I look at the landmark Daiwa Bank Shareholder
Derivative Case' as an important milepost for measuring the results of the
process of change and the likely future areas of debate and development.
In the Daiwa Bank Case, the Osaka District Court, in a voluminous
decision, ordered eleven current and former directors of Daiwa Bank to pay
a total of $775 million in damages in two cases related to the bank's wellknown 1995 trading loss scandal. 2 In the first case, the court found that
the Daiwa directors' failure to establish an appropriate internal control system, which could have prevented or discovered a $1.1 billion loss resulting
from unauthorized trading in the bank's New York branch, was a breach of
their duty of care. 3 In the second case, the court found a breach of the
directors' duty to comply with law in connection with concealment of
losses and failure to report criminal activity to U.S. authorities in the timely
manner that United States law requires. 4 The resulting "Daiwa shock" had
a far-reaching effect in Japan similar to the combined impact the leading
Delaware cases, Van Gorkom5 and Caremark,6 had in the United States.
1.
Case].
2.
3.
4.
5.

Nishimura v. Abekawa, 1573

SHOJI HOMU

3 (Osaka Dist. Ct., 2000) [Daiwa Bank

Id. at 4.

Id. at 5, 40-41 1Ko case or "First Case"].
Id. at 47 [Otsu case or "Second Case"].
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) [Trans Union Case].
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The aftermath of the Daiwa Bank Case includes important substantive legal
doctrine, a seemingly more activist role for courts, increased importance of
preventive legal advice, a breakdown in the market for directors' liability
insurance and new legislation to limit directors' liability and address issues
of corporate governance.
We may look to the U.S. experience as an example in order to identify
important elements in a transformation of corporate governance. During
the 1980s, the model of corporate governance in the United States was
undergoing a major change, from a system in which CEOs and other insiders often dominated corporate boards, to a system in which, at least in its
idealized form, outside directors dominated boards, supervised management and in turn were themselves subject to monitoring by shareholders
and external market forces. 7 One factor supporting this transformation"
was the use of the shareholder derivative suit system to buttress the
increased emphasis on an independent and effective board of directors.
Although considerable skepticism remains in the United States about the
efficacy of the derivative suit system in monitoring board performance, one
would anticipate that at least those few cases establishing new or broader
duties for directors would have a widespread impact on corporate governance practices. 9
6. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
7. Such an idealized model of corporate governance should be used with caution,
as it would be most applicable to a relatively small number of large public corporations
in the United States, which have diverse shareholders and are subject to exchange rules,
rather than to corporations generally. In Japan as well, the largest corporations would
be most likely to conform to the best practices and theories of corporate governance.
8. The background for this transformation was the general economic malaise of
much of the 1980s and an increase in mergers and acquisitions activity, often by financial purchasers, which highlighted the potential conflict of interest between entrenched
management and shareholders. The rise of activist institutional shareholders also
played a significant role. For a summary and evaluation of such changes in U.S. corporate governance, see, for example, Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in
America 1950-2000: Major Changes but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349 (2000)
(citing growth of institutional investors, development and decline of takeover bids, disclosures of illegal campaign contributions following the Nixon scandals and numerous
proposals for improved corporate governances as principal developments which led to
changes in corporate governance).
9. A widely accepted view holds that strike suits are prevalent, with unmeritorious
suits settled due to indemnification provisions and Directors and Officers' (D&O) insurance and with the true parties in interest being the plaintiffs' attorneys. Quantitative
analysis indicates that there are no net economic benefits to shareholders and the evidence of indirect benefits (derivative suits acting as a backup monitor of management)
are at best mixed. See generally Roberta Romano, The ShareholderSuit: Litigation Without Foundation?,7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991). This analysis has also been applied to
Japan, with a similar finding that plaintiffs' attorneys are the true parties in interest there
as well. See Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. Legal
Stud. 351 (2001).
However, even accepting the results of such quantitative analysis with respect to the
net benefits resulting from the derivative suit system, there is still room for certain cases
to have a significant impact on corporate governance practices. Indeed, the above analysis notes an exception with regard to the few cases that formulate legal rules. These legal
rules are public goods which affect the basis of contractual relations between managers
and shareholders. See Romano supra. I view the Daiwa Bank Case as the most dramatic,
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Is a similar transformation of the model of corporate governance now
underway in Japan? Certainly the "lost decade" of economic stagnation in
the 1990s prompted a general willingness to consider changing past practices. In addition, virtually all of the elements underpinning the popular
view of Japanese corporate governance are undergoing significant change.
However, the possibility of a real transformation in the Japanese system of corporate governance invokes skepticism. Rather than looking for
new developments in Japan, 10 commentators on comparative corporate
governance have proceeded directly to ruminations concerning convergence theory-i.e., whether the European/Japanese bank-monitoring system of corporate governance is evolving to become more like, or converging
with, the "Anglo-Saxon" market-based model. This theory's classification
of Japan as having an informal and internally oriented "bank-centcred corporate governance" may itself serve to reinforce the popular view of a Japan
as resistant to change. In addition, the historical and other factors cited by
proponents of path dependence might provide modern clothing for old
views concerning the importance of a presumably unchanging Japanese
culture.
The greatest skepticism concerning transformation of Japanese corporate governance may still derive from our deeply embedded views concerning the role of law and the legal system in Japan. The debate about the role
of law in Japan has a long history. Initial efforts by Japanese commentators to explain Japan's relative lack of litigation or other use of formal law,
despite its economic advances, focused on Japan's underlying cultural values and supposed lack of "legal consciousness."" Generalists in comparative legal studies, many of whom have a European orientation, also utilize
similar assumptions in classifying national legal systems based on cultural
and perhaps the only, derivative suit in Japan which provides such a legal rule/public
good, and examine its significance and impact on Japanese corporate governance. It is
also useful to note generally that settlement practices as well as indemnification and
D&O insurance in Japan are less developed than and presumably less conducive to
strike suits than those in the U.S.
10. As real change has begun only over the last several years, Japan's progress is
gradual and uneven. Further, many significant reforms, such as mark-to-market
accounting rules, are effective on a prospective basis and do not resolve outstanding
issues such as the huge overhang of non-performing bank loans. In addition, there is no
widely accepted standard for deciding whether Japan is "really" changing. Although this
underlying issue is not addressed here, at a minimum one should suspend any disbelief
concerning overall "structural reform" in Japan in order to judge changes in Japanese
corporate governance on their own merits.
11. The best known and most frequently cited proponent of this view was Professor
Takeyoshi Kawashima, a sociology of law expert at the University of Tokyo, see
Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963); Takeyoshi
Kawashima, The Legal Consciousnessof Contract in Japan, 7 LAWJAPAN 1 (Charles Stevens
trans., 1974). For an opposing view that the supposed historical lack of legal consciousness is a myth, see Frank K. Upham, Weak Legal Consciousness as Invented Tradition, in
MIRROR OF MODERNITY: INVENTED TRADITIONS OF MODERN JAPAN 48 (Stephen Vlastos ed.,
1998).
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explanations-at least with respect to non-Western societies. ' 2 As the Japanese economic boom continued into and intensified in the 1980s, it gave
rise to a new "Japanese" model of development, which continued to emphasize culture and informality in the context of close government-business
consultation as the prevalent form of regulatory practice in Japan.
Meanwhile, Japanese law specialists challenged the validity of the
assumption of the prevalence of cultural values by providing alternative
explanations for Japan's litigation rate and legal system's role. These alter14
13
native explanations, such as institutional factors, economic analysis,
and informal bureaucratic controls,' 5 come from a variety of perspectives
which all included a greater appreciation of the role of law in Japan than
was evident in the prior literature. Such views were generally not incorporated into the debate in the 1990s concerning whether various forms of
corporate governance were headed for convergence. 16 While several
branches of convergence theory emerged, 17 by the mid-1990s this debate
12. Such classification systems not only produce simplistic views of various legal
systems, they are also inconsistent, as Japan has variously been characterized as belonging to a "Far Eastern" family and a civil law family, among others. See Annette Marfording, The Fallacy of the Classification of Legal Systems: Japan Examined, in ASIAN LAWS
THROUGH AUSTRALIAN EYES 65 (Veronica Taylor ed., 1997); Frank K. Upham, The Place of
Japanese Legal Studies in American Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 639.
13. Specialists advocating the institutional factors approach argued that court
delays, a dearth of effective remedies, and a lack of lawyers created institutional barriers
to litigation. See John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD.
359 (1978); see generallyJOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX (1991).
14. The economic analysis view emphasizes that the key point was not institutional
barriers, but rather institutional successes-for example, the effective and predictable
functioning of the court system allowed litigants to settle claims in traffic accident cases
efficiently without resorting to court. See generally J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU
NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH (1999); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of
the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in
Japan, 94 YALE L.J.604 (1985); J. Mark Ramseyer, Opinion and Comment, Reluctant
Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in Japan, 14 J. JAPANESE STUD. 11 (1988).
15. The informal bureaucratic controls analysis found that bureaucrats utilized
informal mechanisms to defuse and channel social conflict away from the court system.
See generally FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987); Takao
Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 651 (1990).
16. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospectsfor Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999)
(comparing and contrasting the "Anglo-Saxon" model of broadly dispersed share ownership and external market monitoring of management performance with the European/
Japanese model of bank-centered shareholding and internal monitoring). Some commentators have also cited differences in common law versus civil law systems in support
of the U.S.-U.K./Europe-Japan dichotomy. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatizationand
Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 38
(1999).
17. In one of the two main branches of convergence theory, neoclassical economists
posited that market efficiencies would produce convergence as a result of international
competition among systems of corporate governance ("convergence-from-competition"
theory). See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991). The opposing view focused on the barriers to change in corporate structure imposed by political and historical factors as preventing convergence
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arguably assumed an underlying tone that "convergence" meant the rest of
the world becoming more like the United States.
When American comparative corporate law scholars initially sought to
explain Japan's economic success in the early 1990s they relied on economic analyses, 18 and accepted as given that law played no real role in the
Japanese system. 19 Questions concerning the prevalent internal monitoring model of Japanese corporate governance are assuming greater urgency
now that the model has undergone its first real "stress test" during Japan's
prolonged economic malaise of the 1990s. Each element of the internal
monitoring model is now undergoing significant change, 20 and particularly over the past few years the model's predictive value has arguably
("path dependence" theory). See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991); Lucian A. Bebchuk & MarkJ. Roe, A Theory of
Path Dependence in CorporateOwnership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
Between these extremes was a view which emphasized the legal protections afforded
minority shareholders as a method for comparing governance systems and as a condition for the development of liquid capital markets ("law matters" theory). See Rafael La

Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=183908 (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
Another intermediate view held that due to self-regulatory substitutes for formal law,
functional convergence may occur even if formal convergence is blocked by legal or institutional barriers ("functional convergence"). See Coffee, The Future as History, supra
note 16. For the origin of the emphasis on formal convergence versus functional conver-

gence, see Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 192, Columbia Law and

Economics, Working Paper No. 174, May 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=229517 (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
18. The best known work was that of Masahiko Aoki, who cited the main bank and
cross-shareholding as institutions which: (1) supported management's promise of lifetime employment in an internally focused and stable system and; (2) would intervene in
such arrangements only if the company fell into distress. See Masahiko Aoki, Toward an
Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1990); see also Masahiko Aoki,

Monitoring Characteristicsof the Main Bank System: An Analytical and Developmental
View,

in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORM-

109 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994); Paul Sheard, The Main
Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan, I1 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG.
399 (1989).
19. See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE UJ. 871, 899
ING ECONOMICS

(1993) (accepting the popular assumption that due to some combination of weak law
and strong cultural values Japan needed to develop informal substitutes for long-term

contracts and other legal mechanisms); see also sources cited supra note 18. Curtis
Milhaupt thus describes the role of law in this prevailing view of Japanese corporate
governance as being "conspicuous by its absence." See Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational
Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV
INT'L. L.J. 3, 4 (1996).
20. Among these, perhaps the most fundamental and clearly measurable change is
the recent widespread unwinding of cross-shareholding. During the period from
1995-2000 the 31% share of public corporations held by banks and insurance compa-

nies fell to 22%, while the percentage of shares of public corporations held by foreign
investors increased from 8% to 19%. See, e.g., Zadankai: Kaishaho Daikaisei no Igi
[Panel Discussion: Significance of Major Revision to the Company Law] 1206 JURISTO 6,
7 (2001) (Speaker: Fukao). Similar trends can be seen for other "stable" shareholders
and in 2001 trades by foreign investors constituted more than half of the trading volume
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
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failed. 2 1 Despite efforts made by the limited number of Japanese corporate
law specialists, 22 the internal monitoring model of Japanese corporate governance continues to dominate comparative corporate law literature. As
noted above, an emphasis on cultural values by both Japanese legal scholars and their Western counterparts, together with the Japanese model of
development and, more recently, convergence theory, all served to reinforce the prevailing view that Japanese corporate governance and society
emphasize informality over law.
In this Article, I look to the dramatic example of the Daiwa Bank Case
and its aftermath in order to examine the role of law in Japanese corporate
governance. The court's decision sharply criticized the bank's reliance on
informal consultations with the government and strongly emphasized the
importance of directors' independent judgment in fulfilling their fiduciary
duties. Thus, this decision shocked the business community. Its after21. A number of major Japanese corporations have collapsed and entered into bankruptcy proceedings under a new Civil Rehabilitation Law enacted in 1999. See generally
Minji Saisei Ho [Civil Rehabilitation Law], Law No. 225 of 1999. This law encourages
bankruptcy by providing for debtor-in-possession restructuring in contrast to the courtappointed trustee mandated under pre-existing law. In addition, these cases indicated
that, not only has the main banks' purported ex ante monitoring function failed, but that
even the heretofore unquestioned ex post workout function is no longer reliable.
22. Mark Ramseyer has directly attacked this prevailing model, arguing that many of
its features, such as keiretsu and the main bank, are myths. See J. Mark Ramseyer,
Repeated Deals, 20 J. LEGAl STUD. 91 (1991); J. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for
Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic To the Japanese Main Bank System, in JAPANESE MAIN
BANK SYSTEM, supra note 18, at 231; Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Review Essay,
The Myth of the Main Bank:Japanand ComparativeCorporateGovernance, 27 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 401 (2002) (reviewing, MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,

USA,

AND INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, COMPETITIVENESS IN JAPAN, THE
ECONOMIES (Stacey Jehlik trans., 2000)); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark

the Keiretsu, 11 J. ECON. &

MGMT. STRATEGY

AND THE TRANSITIONAL

Ramseyer, The Fable of

169 (2002).

A more widespread criticism of the prevalent view of Japanese corporate governance is
that it tends to be utilized as an idealized stereotype-by the time it was popularized in
the 1980s the institutions it describes were arguably already in decline. Some commentators have sought to broaden this popular model by providing for a greater role for
formal law and a more systematic method of accounting for non-legal social norms without relying on a vague concept of cultural values. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm
Destruction:The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in JapaneseCorporate Governance, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 2083 (2001); Milhaupt, supra note 19; Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social
Norms in Japan's Secret World of Sumo, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997). For a recent comment on this popular view of Japanese corporate governance and Ramseyer's criticism of
it, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the Main Bank System and Other
Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 425 (2002).
Skepticism of the internal monitoring model of Japanese corporate governance is not
limited to Japanese law specialists. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Convergence and Its Critics:
What Are the Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and Control? (Working Paper
No. 179, 2000) Sept. 12, 2000 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.taf?abstract id=241782 (stating that banks prefer liquidity over control and that
"financial institutions ... do not naturally desire to perform the monitoring and oversight role accorded to them by the theorists of concentrated ownership") (last visited
Apr. 17, 2003); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, CorporateGovernance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Japan, Germany and the United States, 48
STAN. L. REV. 73 (1995) (arguing that bank monitoring is for the purpose of protecting
the bank's own fixed claims against its borrowers, which is critically different from monitoring on behalf of shareholders).
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effects are likely to be significant and long-lasting, similar to the impact
created by U.S. court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s. The Daiwa Bank
Case utilized the formal legal system-shareholder derivative suits, courts,
and lawyers-which is afforded little importance under the popular view of
Japanese corporate governance. Significantly, I find that the Daiwa Bank
Case dramatically highlights and strengthens an underlying trend that
began during the 1990s, in which the formal legal system has gradually
come to play an increasingly important role in Japanese corporate governance. I conclude that we must re-examine the role of law in corporate governance in light of the ongoing changes occurring in Japan.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I provides the factual background of the Daiwa Bank Scandal, summarizes the relevant Japanese corporate law, and then examines an important preliminary ruling in the
Daiwa Bank Case which may ease plaintiffs' burden of pleading in future
derivative litigation. Part II covers the significance of the Daiwa Bank Case.
Part III compares the Daiwa Bank Case with relevant U.S. case law, finding
some striking similarities in approach. Part IV discusses the aftermath of
the Daiwa Bank Case, which includes an increasingly important function
for the shareholder derivative suit system, significant changes in corporate
practices, impact on the market for directors' liability insurance and legislative reaction to the court's ruling. Finally, Part V reconsiders the importance of law in Japanese corporate governance and concludes that the role
of law continues to increase in importance due to recent changes in Japan
as exemplified by the Daiwa Bank Case. However, Part V also suggests
caution in applying convergence theory to Japan's consideration and adaptation of certain elements of "American-style" corporate governance, a process which might be better characterized by means of traditional notions of
legal borrowing.
1. Shareholder Derivative Suit System and the Daiwa Bank Scandal
A.

The Daiwa Bank Scandal-Factual Background in the U.S. and Japan

The tale begins with the 1976 hiring of Toshihide Iguchi 23 as a local
employee of the New York branch ("NY Branch") of Daiwa Bank Limited
(Daiwa). 2 4 By 1984, Iguchi was in charge of both securities trading and
23. Iguchi moved from Japan to the United States to attend Southwest Missouri State
University and majored in psychology. Upon graduation in 1975, he briefly sold used
cars and then joined the New York Branch of Daiwa Bank. Thus, he did not have the
"elite" resume of a typical managerial employee of a major Japanese bank and had no
prior experience in banking. According to Iguchi's book, written later while in prison,
he obtained a job at Daiwa through his father's personal connections. See TOSHIHIDE
IGUCHI, KOKUHAKU [The Confession] 116 (1997).
24. Daiwa Bank is one of the smaller of Japan's eleven "city banks" or money center
banks. In 1995, it was the tenth largest bank in Japan and the thirteenth largest in the
world with total assets of some $390 billion. As a foreign bank operating in the U.S.,
Daiwa was subject to banking regulations which essentially were similar to those applicable to domestic banks. Daiwa was supervised by a state regulator, the New York State
Banking Department in the case of the NY Branch and its New York-charted trust subsid-
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custody as well as some related back office functions. 25 Although Iguchi
initially made a small trading profit, he soon began to accumulate steadily
mounting losses which eventually-with some 30,000 trades-reached $1.1
billion by the time the incident came to light in 1995. Iguchi then, in an
attempt to conceal his losses that occurred throughout the period, ordered
the unauthorized sales of $377 million of customer securities, as well as
other bank securities.
26
In July 1995, Iguchi wrote a confession letter to Daiwa's president.
Upon confirmation of the letter's contents, Daiwa's president decided the
bank's basic position would be to maintain secrecy and cooperate with
Iguchi in order to cover up the losses. 2 7 On August 8, the president and
other top Daiwa executives met informally for dinner at the bank's guest
house with Ministry of Finance (MOF) officials to report the matter and
obtain approval for their approach. Daiwa continued to conduct business
as usual at its NY Branch from early August until mid-September, 28 when it
finally reported its losses to U.S. and Japanese bank regulators seven weeks
after the receipt of Iguchi's first confession letter and five weeks after informally reporting the matter to the MOF. 2 9 U.S. bank regulators and prosecutors soon realized that the matter was far broader and more serious than
iary, and federal regulators, the Federal Reserve Board for the NY Branch and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for its trust subsidiary.
25. Nishimura v. Abekawa, 1573 SHoJI HOMU 3, 22 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Sept. 20, 2000)
[Daiwa Bank Case]. It is appropriate to separate securities trading and custody precisely
because of the potential for wrongdoing, with a trader being in a position to obtain
funding through the unauthorized sale or lending of custody securities. This was exacerbated by Iguchi also having responsibilities for some related back office functions
such as trade confirmations, settlement of trades, and recordkeeping. Id. at 35-36.
26. This letter dated July 17, which Iguchi labeled his "honest confession," revealed
the $1.1 billion trading loss and other unauthorized actions, warned of the dire consequences of this information becoming public and went on to suggest methods to minimize the likelihood of discovery of the losses by U.S. authorities. His primary advice
was to replace the missing securities and move the concealed loss out of the United
States so that U.S. authorities would not handle the matter. See United States v. Daiwa
Bank Ltd., No. 95 Cr. 947, at 4-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) [Daiwa Indictment].
27. Daiwa Bank Case, 1573 SHOJI HOMU at 31. According to the decision in the
Daiwa Bank Case, the bank's president decided that Daiwa's basic position would be as
follows: (i) obtain the continued cooperation of Iguchi; (ii) obtain a complete picture of
the unauthorized transactions and sales; (iii) carefully safeguard this information and
maintain secrecy; (iv) examine whether the bank could write off the entire amount of the
loss during the current fiscal half-year; and (v) obtain an appointment with the Ministry
of Finance (MOF) for quick disclosure of the case. There apparently was no consideration of whether to report the losses to U.S. authorities. Id.
28. Numerous actions were also undertaken to conceal the losses, including the continuing sale of custody securities and creation of fictitious custody account statements
as well as the filing of its regular quarterly call report with the Federal Reserve Board
which contained some $600 million of non-existent assets. In addition, management
initiated a fictitious transfer of the missing securities to Daiwa's head office. United
States v. Daiwa Bank Ltd., No. 95 Cr. 947, at 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) [Daiwa Indictment].
29. Federal bank regulations set a maximum thirty-day limit for reporting suspected
criminal activity and require immediate notification by telephone in the case of emergencies. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.24(0 & 208.20 (1995). New York State banking regulations also require immediate reporting of losses. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3,
§ 300.1 (1995).
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The U.S. authorities reacted swiftly and decisively. Bank regulators
first issued a notice of hearing and interim orders, then on the second of
November, they levied the "death penalty" against Daiwa and its trust subsidiary by issuing consent orders requiring them to cease all U.S. banking
business and surrender their banking licenses within ninety days. 3 1 With
respect to criminal liability, on the second of November a grand jury
handed down a twenty-four count indictment of Daiwa 3 2 and a two count

indictment of the NY Branch's general manager. 33 Meanwhile on October
34
19, 1995, Iguchi pleaded guilty to all six counts of his charge.
Daiwa entered into a plea bargain on February 28, 1996, in which it
35
pleaded guilty to sixteen of the twenty-four counts in the indictment.
The bank agreed to pay a criminal fine of $340 million, the largest criminal
fine levied on a financial institution in U.S. history. 36 The NY Branch general manager also pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea bargain, on October
25, 1996.

37

Fallout from the case in the United States was significant. Congressional committees in both houses held hearings on the Daiwa Bank Scan30. They discovered the involvement of the bank's top management in a cover-up
and its prior report of the matter to the MOF in Japan. They also learned for the first
time of a prior similar case of unauthorized trading and unreported losses at Daiwa's
trust subsidiary and false statements to bank examiners about securities trading operations during the NY Branch's examinations in 1992 and 1993. See Daiwa Indictment, at
31-34. Much of this information apparently came from Iguchi, who was arrested by the
FBI on September 23, 1995, and later charged with six counts of embezzlement and
financial fraud. See United States v. Iguchi, No. 95 Cr. 914 (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995)
[Iguchi Indictment].
31. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, New York State Banking Department, Joint Statement (Nov. 2, 1995). The
termination order was issued jointly by the Federal Reserve Board and the six state bank
regulators in states where Daiwa maintained offices.
32. Daiwa Indictment, No. 95 Cr. 947.
33. See Complaint, United States v. Tsuda, No. 95 Mag. 2124 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995)
(charging Tsuda with deceiving bank examiners and falsifying bank documents).
34. On December 16, 1996 Iguchi was sentenced to a four-year prison term and a
two million dollar fine. See Former Daiwa Trader Sentenced in Cover-Up of $1.1 Billion

Loss, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at D12.
35. See Laurie Hays, Daiwa Bank Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Hide Loss: Japanese
Firm Also to Pay U.S. a $340 Million Fine in the Trading Scandal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29,
1996, at A3; Nishimura v. Abekawa, 1573 SHOJI HOMU 3, 5-7 (Osaka Dist. Ct., 2000)

[Daiwa Bank Case].
36. Daiwa faced a potential fine of over a billion dollars under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. The range of fines for a particular offense is calculated according to a "base
fine," i.e., the amount of the pecuniary loss or gain multiplied by a factor based on the
culpability of the organization. In this case Daiwa would receive the highest culpability
score, resulting in a multiplication of the customer losses ($377 million) by a factor of
two to four. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2 (1995).
37. At the time of Tsuda's indictment, the U.S. attorney stated that if convicted,
Tsuda faced a prison term of up to eight years and $500,000 in fines. See, e.g., James R.
Kraus, Daiwa Wants Court To Drop Charges in Trading Cover-Up Case, AMERICAN BANKER,

Jan. 23, 1996, at 6. Under the plea bargain, Tsuda received two months imprisonment
and a $100,000 fine. See Ex-Daiwa Manager Gets 2-Month Term, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,

1996, at 38.
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dal and the failure of regulatory oversight. The themes of these hearings
were Daiwa's violation of the basic trust necessary between banks and regulators, 38 and the failure of the Japanese MOF to disclose the matter to U.S.
39
authorities despite international agreements on regulatory cooperation.
The Daiwa Bank Scandal shattered the underlying assumption that Japanese practices and banking regulation were fundamentally sound.
In Japan, Daiwa suffered business setbacks, 40 and the top executives
of the bank resigned in October 1995, shortly after the public announcement of the incident. The market began to assess a premium on Japanese
banks for inter-bank loans. An embarrassed MOF initiated its own sanctions against Daiwa Bank and pledged closer cooperation with U.S. bank
regulators in the future. It suddenly became possible and even popular in
Japan to advocate the break-up of the powerful MOF in conjunction with
ongoing administrative reforms. 4 ' On October 23, 1995, shareholders initiated a derivative action against all Daiwa Bank directors and statutory
auditors for the period of 1984-1995 ("First Case"). 4 2 Following the
bank's plea bargain in New York, shareholders filed an additional derivative suit against the directors and statutory auditors ("Second Case") on
March 17, 1996.

43

B. Japanese Law on Directors' Duties and Derivative Suits
Notwithstanding some important formal differences, the basic scheme of
Japanese corporate law and directors' duties is functionally similar to U.S.
law. Japanese practice has departed substantially from its Commercial
Code's theory, as evidenced by management's dominance over Japanese
38. Chairman Greenspan stated that "It]rust is a principle of central importance to
all effective financial systems. An assumption that most bankers are truthful should
remain the rule not the exception. However, when a bank has shown through repeated
actions that it cannot be trusted, even at the highest levels of the corporation, supervisors should resort to extraordinary regulatory measures." U.S. Senate Banking Committee Hearing On The Daiwa Bank OfJapan And The Supervision Of Foreign Banks Operating
In The United States, 104th Cong. 4, 5, 14 (1995) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
39. In studied understatement, Greenspan noted that "[t]his lapse on the part of the
Ministry of Finance is regrettable because open communication and close cooperation
among supervisory authorities are essential to the maintenance of the integrity of the
international financial system." Id. at 2. In a letter to Mr. Greenspan, committee chairman D'Amato was less circumspect, stating: "[tihe Japanese government's apparent collusion with Daiwa in withholding crucial information from U.S. authorities and allowing
Daiwa to break U.S. laws is a serious breach of trust between our governments." See 65
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 673 (Oct. 23, 1995).
40. Daiwa's rating was downgraded two notches by Standard and Poor's. It sold its
U.S. operations to Sumitomo Bank and did not participate in the reorganization of
Japan's city banks into four major banking groups. It instead absorbed some local
regional banks in an effort to become a "super-regional" bank and later formed a banking group with troubled Asahi Bank.
41. For citation to and discussion of articles in the popular press, see Mitsuru Misawa, Daiwa Bank Scandal in New York: Its Causes, Significance, and Lessons in the International Society, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1023 (1996).
42. Daiwa Bank Case, at 3, 5, 40-41 [Ko case or "First Case"].
43. Daiwa Bank Case, at 5, 47 [Otsu case or "Second Case"].
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44
corporations with little effective oversight by other corporate organs.
This gap between legal theory and actual corporate practice, although also
true in the United States at least until the 1980s, reinforced the view that
Japanese corporate governance is an insider-based system removed from
the Commercial Code's formal legal structure.
Like many early corporate laws, the Japanese Commercial Code
(Shoho) was premised on a limited number of shareholders exercising relatively direct control over the corporation's business. When the Commercial Code was rewritten in 1950 under the U.S. occupation, it incorporated
American methods of dealing with the fundamental issue of the separation
of ownership and control in modern corporations by increasing directors'
power to oversee the management of day-to-day business operations and
giving shareholders new rights to monitor directors and prevent abuse of
their authority. 45 Also, as a unitary civil law system, the relevant corporate
laws are all national laws establishing the duties of directors by statute.
However, the Commercial Code also retains the German-inspired position of statutory auditor 46 and has no provision for officers. Traditionally,
there is no separation of managers and directors in Japanese corpora-

tions. 4 7 However, the Commercial Code does provide for representative

directors, who are elected by the board and have the authority to represent
48
a corporation much like a president.
Shareholder-elected directors owe fiduciary duties, which are generally
similar to those under U.S. law, to the corporation and its shareholders.
Additionally, code provisions on directors' duties include a specific duty of
compliance with laws and regulations. 4 9 The Commercial Code requires
statutory auditors, who are also elected by shareholders, to monitor the
44. Many commentators have noted the gap between theory and structure under the
Commercial Code and actual practice in Japan. See, e.g., Milhaupt, supra note 19, at 19
(stating that the shareholder-agency theory on which formal Japanese corporate law is
based "bears little resemblance" to corporate practice).
45. The new postwar emphasis on shareholders' rights included shareholder access
to corporate books and records, transferability of shares, cumulative voting and other
voting rights, and the introduction of a board of directors and director liability. See
SHOHO arts. 293-6, 204, 256-3, 254-269. See generally Mark D. West, The Pricing of
Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1436,
1445-46 (1994). As a result, most aspects of Japanese corporate law, including provisions relating to directors, look familiar.
46. See SHOHO art. 274(1); see also supra note 45.
47. Instead, directors are virtually all senior managers promoted from within the
firm; becoming a director is regarded merely as a step up in the chain of promotion.
This has led to large boards with hierarchical structures in which directors retain "line"
responsibilities to be in charge of a department of the corporation.
48. See SHOHO art. 261. Every corporation must have one representative director.
Larger corporations often have several representative directors, any one of whom may
bind the corporation.
49. SHOHO art. 266(1)(v) (specifically creating director's liability for failure to comply with laws, ordinances and the articles of incorporation), art. 254-3 (including in a
director's fiduciary duty an obligation to comply with laws, ordinances, the articles of
incorporation and resolutions of general shareholders' meetings).
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directors' performance.5 0 Although the statutory auditors' basic function
is to act as a check on directors' conduct, their role is not identical to that
51
of a German Supervisory Board.
Like shareholder derivative suit systems elsewhere, the Japanese system recognizes that the suits depart from normal corporate decision-making and tries to strike a balance between affording directors sufficient
discretion to make business decisions and providing directors with an
incentive for good faith performance of their fiduciary duties. The fear of
abuse of derivative litigation is probably even stronger in Japan than elsewhere due perhaps to the past role of "sokaiya" racketeers 52 in extorting
money from corporate management and a general reluctance to place substantial liability on individual directors who, in most cases are merely
employees who have risen through the ranks.
Since 1950, the Commercial Code has contained provisions allowing
derivative actions by shareholders against corporate directors and statutory
auditors for any breach of duty owed to the corporation.5 3 However, until
the mid-1980s, the derivative suit provisions were virtually dormant. The
reasons for their disuse seem to be due economic and institutional factors,

50. Id. arts. 273-280. Statutory auditors also owe a duty of care to the corporation,
but not a duty of loyalty under the theory that they are not involved in conducting the
corporation's business and would therefore not have any conflicts of interest. Although
they have no direct duty with respect to compliance with laws, their duty to audit the
performance of directors would include monitoring of the directors' compliance with
laws. Their function is to oversee the performance of directors generally, and does not
focus on accounting issues or financial statements. The powers of Japanese statutory
auditors under the Commercial Code include the right to request business reports, to
conduct investigations, and to enjoin illegal or ultra vires conduct by directors. Id. arts.
274(2), 275-2. Statutory auditors are also obligated to review proposals and documents
to be submitted to general meetings of shareholders. Id. art. 275. Directors are obligated to report immediately to statutory auditors upon the discovery of facts that may
lead to a significant loss to the corporation. Id. art. 274-2. By amendment of the Commercial Code in 1993, every large corporation must have at least one statutory auditor
who was not a director or employee of the corporation during the preceding five years.
51. Although based on a Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat) under German law, statutory auditors in Japan have a weaker position than their German counterparts vis-a-vis
the board of directors. A German Supervisory Board typically appoints the members of
the Board of Management (Vorstand). Statutory auditors in Japan, while elected by
shareholders, have no corresponding power of appointment of directors, who are also
directly elected by shareholders.
52. In a relatively closed system, the biggest "shareholder" challenge to management
came from sohaiya, or racketeer shareholders, who essentially extorted money from corporate management in exchange for silence or support, particularly at general shareholders' meetings. See generally Mark D. West, Information, Institutions and Extortion in
Japan and the United States: Making Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 767
(1999).
53. See SHOHO arts. 267-268-3. Although there is a universal requirement for making a demand to the corporation prior to instituting suit, refusal of a shareholder
demand is not awarded any particular deference by courts. See id. art. 267. For specific
rules concerning derivative suits in Japan, see, for example, Shiro Kawashima & Susumu
Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan: Law, Practice, and Suggested Reforms,
33 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 9, 23 (1997); West, supra note 9.
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rather than to any cultural aversion to litigation. 5 4
The first successful derivative suit in 1986, 55 the collapse of the bubble economy, and an important revision to the Commercial Code in 1993,
which greatly reduced filing fees for derivative suits, set the stage for
change. 5 6 The resulting increase in the number of derivative suits in the
1990s was far greater than anticipated. 57 To weed out abusive cases the
courts began to utilize a dormant "security for expenses" provision of the
Commercial Code, interpreting it as only requiring proof of the low likelihood of the plaintiffs prevailing on the merits of the case, rather than as
requiring the establishment of subjective bad faith. 58
In many motions decided during the 1994-96 period, the courts followed this standard and ordered plaintiffs to post substantial amounts as
59
security for expenses, thus effectively ending the derivative litigation.
Plaintiffs only survived defendant's claim for security for expenses when
they were able to overcome Japan's ineffective discovery system by piggybacking on a record created by a criminal or other official investigation.
Similarly, plaintiffs were only successful in obtaining settlements in cases
54. One obvious element is that the strong economic performance of many Japanese
companies in the postwar period gave shareholders little cause for complaint. The Japanese system also provided economic disincentives to instituting derivative litigation in
the form of filing fees and attorneys' fees. See West, supra note 45 (arguing that the lack
of economic incentives generally, and the attorney's lack of economic incentive under
the Japanese system in particular, was the critical factor in the extremely low rate of
derivative litigation in Japan before 1993). Defendants prevailed in the few derivative
suits which were brought.
55. Mizuno v. Ariyoshi, 1194 HANREI JiHo 33 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., May 29, 1986) [Mitsui
Mining Case], aff'd, 1188 SHoJI HOMU 36 (Tokyo High Ct., July 3, 1989), aff'd, 47-7
MINSHU 4814 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 9, 1993).
56. U.S. pressure for transparent corporate governance in Japan as part of trade policy under the Structural Impediments Initiative combined with domestic pressures for
change to produce this revision. The amount of the filing fee (literally a stamp tax or
"inshidai") had often been calculated as a percentage of damages claimed. This was
changed to an insignificant fixed fee of 8,200 yen which had been applied to non-monetary claims. See SHOHO art. 267(4).
57. In addition to an increased number of suits, the amount of damages claimed
generally increased and the focus of cases shifted from closely held corporations to large
public corporations. See Comment, Kabunushi no Daihyo Sosho wo Meguru Jokyo [Circumstances SurroundingShareholders' Derivative Litigation], in Kabunushi Daihyo Sosho
no Genjo to Kadai [The Present Condition and Task of Shareholder Derivative Litigation], 173 BESSATSU SHOJI HOMU 4, 5 (1995); see also Kawashima & Sukurai, supra note
53, at 43.
58. See Noguchi v. Kotani, 125 SHIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU 184 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., July 22,
1994) Uanome Sewing Machine]. The Japanese Supreme Court had previously found
the filing of a lawsuit to be a wrongful act where such filing was essentially an abuse of
the court system without specifying the applicable requirements. See Nagano v.
Hirohara, 42-1 MINSHU 1 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 26, 1988); 1281 HANREI JIHO 91 (1988).
59. While this trend was welcomed by many, others argued that it went too far and
would impinge upon shareholders' rights by including some non-frivolous cases within
the scope of the security for expenses provision. See, e.g., Shunsaku Iwahara, Daihyo
Sosho to Kabunushi no Akui [Derivative Litigation and Bad Faith of Shareholders], 948
HANREi TAIMUZU 134 (1997). For similar reasons, in the U.S. a security for expense
provision was dropped from the Model Business Corporation Act when it was revised in
1984. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (1984).
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where directors took illegal action (e.g., paying off sokaiya or bribing government officials), and even in those cases the settlement amounts were for
60
a small fraction of the plaintiffs' claim.
C.

Significance of the Preliminary Ruling in the Daiwa Bank Case

The Daiwa plaintiffs were also subject to a preliminary motion for security
for expenses, which was initially granted by the Osaka District Court. 6 1 As
in many derivative suits, the plaintiffs' factual allegations were based
entirely on published news accounts of the Daiwa Bank Scandal, raising
the issue of whether application of the security for expenses provision was
going beyond the purpose of weeding out abusive suits 6 2 and depriving the
63
plaintiffs of their day in court.

However, the Osaka high court reversed on appeal and denied the
defendants' motion for the plaintiffs to post bond. 64 This ruling not only
allowed the case to proceed on the merits, but also served to check a growing tendency by courts to grant liberally defendants' motions for security
for expenses and set an important precedent for further expanding the use
60. For the low success rate, see West, supra note 9, at 357-58.
61. In a ruling on April 18, 1997, the Osaka District Court ordered the plaintiffs to
post security for expenses in the amount of 20 million yen for each of 35 defendants in
the First Case, totaling 700 million yen or 5.6 million dollars, and 12 million yen for
each of forty-eight defendants in the Second Case, totaling 576 million yen or over 5
million dollars. Abekawa v. Nishimura ("First Case") and Hiraiwa v. Nishimura ("Second Case"), 158 SHIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU 54 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Apr. 18, 1997). The court
concluded that the plaintiffs' factual allegations were "extremely insufficient," giving rise
to an inference that plaintiffs' legal and factual allegations are unlikely to be proven and
that plaintiffs were aware of this when filing suit. [An exchange rate of 120 yen to one
dollar is used in this Article.]
62. The Daiwa Bank Case was not an obviously abusive suit, as the lead plaintiff was
a former employee of Daiwa Bank, whose last position, ironically enough, was deputy
general manager of the bank's Inspection Division, and who had knowledge concerning
internal controls and bank examination issues. For his view of the Daiwa Bank Case,
see Ichiro Nishimura, Daiwa Ginko Todori to no Wagatoso [My Stuggle Against the President of Daiwa Bank], 80 BUNGEI SHUNJU 318 (2002). It is also true, however, that there
reportedly was a perception that one of the plaintiffs' attorneys had previously filed
derivative suits without making any real attempt to prove his case.
63. This criticism may have been buttressed by a perception that the initial flow of
derivative cases after 1993 contained a fair amount of sokaiya-type suits, which resulted
in dismissal due to the plaintiffs' inability to provide security, but that subsequent more
meritorious suits were now also being dismissed. See Tomotaka Fujita, Kabunushi
Daihyo Sosho no Teiki ga Akui ni deta mono to shite Tanpo Teihyo ga Meijirareta ireiiwayuru Daiwa Ginko Jiken [Case which ordered Provision of Security for Filing of a
Shareholders' Derivative Lawsuit in Bad Faith-The So-Called Daiwa Bank case], 1144
JURiSTO 117 (1998). In prior cases, courts had made factual findings contrary to the
plaintiffs' arguments, so that in American terms, the court's action was close to a summary judgment. In no Japanese case to date had a court granted a defendant's motion to
post bond based primarily on vagueness in the plaintiffs' allegations without engaging
in any fact-finding. See id.
64. Nishimura v. Abekawa (First Case), 166 SHIROYOBAN SHOJI HOMU 138 (Osaka
High Ct., Dec. 8, 1997); Nishimura v. Hiraiwa (Second Case), 165 SHIROYOBAN SHoJI
HOMu 291 (Osaka High Ct., Nov. 18, 1997). The court ruled for the first time that the
directors' duty of care included a duty to establish an overall policy on internal controls,
and that the plaintiffs' allegations were therefore sufficient for this stage of the case. Id.
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of shareholder derivative suits. 6 5

II.

Court Decision in the Daiwa Bank Case

Ultimately, on September 20, 2000, the Osaka District Court ordered
eleven current and former directors of Daiwa Bank to pay a total of $775
million in damages in the two related cases. 66 Both sides initially appealed
the case to the Osaka high court. However, the parties ultimately settled
the case pursuant to an in-court compromise on December 20, 2001. In
the compromise, the plaintiffs accepted a small fraction of the awarded
damage amount in return for making the district court's decision on directors' liability into a final judgment and for obtaining some payment from
67
each of the original forty-nine defendants.
A.

First Case-Director Oversight and Internal Controls

The Daiwa Bank court's decision with respect to the First Case is notable
for its rulings on three issues: (1) a director's liability for a failure of oversight as opposed to an action taken by the director; (2) a corporate board's
obligation to establish an overall policy for internal controls, including risk
management and compliance with laws, and to oversee the formulation
and implementation of specific components of such policy; and (3) a negligence standard for director's' liability without any application of Japan's
version of the business judgment rule.68
69
A theoretical duty of oversight was established in Japan in the 1970s.
65. This more cautious approach to granting motions for security for expenses as
articulated by the Osaka high court appears to have found favor, at least among legal
scholars. For example, the current edition of a widely used code book with case annotations cites two leading cases with respect to the interpretation of bad faith and the security for expenses provision-Nagoya high court ruling in a case involving Tokai Bank and
the Osaka high court ruling in the Daiwa Bank case. Both of these cases state that a
negligent filing of a lawsuit would not, by itself, constitute bad faith. HANREI ROPPO
HENSHU IiNKAI [Case Precedent Basic Codes Editing Committee] MOHAN ROPPO lAnnotated Basic Codes] 1191 (2001).
66. Daiwa Bank Case, at 4. The defendants filed a motion with the Osaka District
Court for stay of execution on the judgment pending appeal; this motion was granted
upon condition that defendants post bond in an amount over 829 million yen ($6
million).
67. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
68. In the First Case, the court found that the three directors who had been in charge
of the NY Branch during this time period were in breach of their duty to establish specific internal control policies, and one statutory auditor, who on one occasion had
accompanied Daiwa's outside Japanese accounting firm on an audit of the NY Branch
and, accordingly, had an opportunity to discover and correct this shortcoming, had
breached his duty of oversight. Proof of damages was found only for one defendant, and
he was liable for the entire amount, $530 million, of the increase in Iguchi's trading
losses which occurred during his tenure as director in charge of the NY Branch.
69, The early cases involved the failure of closely held companies and non-functioning boards, focusing on the liability of nominal directors to third-party creditors. A
Supreme Court case in 1973 established a duty of oversight, which was subsequently
incorporated into the Commercial Code in 1976. See Hashimoto v Kobayashi, 27-25
MINSHU 655 (S. Ct., May 22, 1973); SHOHO art. 260(1). At that time, the code also
granted directors new rights to convene or demand a board meeting in order to aid the
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In the context of a large corporation, oversight was primarily meaningful in
the context of creating policies and systems to prevent and detect employee
wrongdoing. Upon finding that appropriate systems designed to prevent
wrongdoing were in place, a court would examine whether the director in
charge of the relevant area exercised appropriate supervision over his
subordinate employees. Thus, from an American perspective, the lack of
separation of directors and officers might result in an inquiry seeming to
focus more on officer-type liability than on directors' liability. 70 In any
case, directors were not actually found liable for failing to monitor corpo1
rate activities.

7

The Daiwa Bank court initially discussed the duty of the board of
directors to establish an appropriate risk management system. 72 The court
also recognized the principle of reliance, noting that board members will
not be liable for their subordinates' mistakes unless special circumstances
73
raised doubts about the performance of delegated responsibilities.
The court's view of the board's duty to establish internal control policies, however, conflicted with existing Japanese practice. Japanese banks
did not generally deal with internal controls and compliance policies at the
exercise of such oversight function. SHOHO art. 259(2)(3). A subsequent Supreme
Court decision in 1980 extended this oversight duty to nominal outside directors. See
Daid6 Sanso Kabushiki Gaisha v. Suga, 971 HANRE! JIHO 101 (S. Ct., Mar. 18, 1980). See
generally Tetuso Shimabukuro, Torishimariyaku no Kanshi Gimu to Shoho 266-3 [Over-

sight Duty of Board Directors and Commercial Code 266 -3], 149

BESSATSU JURISTO

122

(1998).
70. The inquiry concerning directors' liability thus typically tends to focus on the
individual director's duty of supervision over his subordinate employees or on the representative director rather than the duty of oversight as exemplified by action or inaction
by the board as a whole. For a discussion of the distinction between these two roles
("duty of oversight" versus "duty of supervision"), see, for example, Jokai Kaishaho no
Kenkyu-Torishimariyaku (2) [Research on Company Law-Board Directors (Part I1)]
200 BESSATSU SHOJI HOMU 1, 46-49 (1997) and id. (Part 4), 219 BESSATSU SHOJI HOMU 1,

55-57 (1999).
71. See Aoki v. Nasu 182 SHiRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU 244 (Tokyo Dist.Ct., Mar. 4, 1999)
[Tokyo Electric Power Case]. In this case, shareholders filed a derivative action against
the president of Tokyo Electric Power for his failure, as representative director, to supervise employees who embezzled corporate funds through a scheme of false and padded

orders sent to printing companies. The court discussed the necessity of establishing
means to prevent and detect such behavior, ruling that "[a director's] duty of supervision
over employees, such as detecting illegal and improper acts of employees or preventing
these in advance, is included within the duty of care." Id. at 252. It found, however, that
the company had appropriate policies and systems in place and that, absent special circumstances, in such a large organization the representative director could rely on his
subordinates to implement the policies. Id.
72. It decided that since the board of directors is charged with deciding important
matters based on SHOHO art. 260(2), it must decide the basic policy for risk management. The court found that the board of directors has a duty to establish overall risk
management policies, the representative director and director in charge have the duty to
establish specific risk management policies, other directors have a duty of oversight with
respect to the primary directors fulfilling their duty and auditors have a duty of oversight
with respect to the board as a whole. Daiwa Bank Case, 34. This is consistent with the
approach generally taken by Japanese courts. See Tokyo Electric Power Case, 182 SHIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU at 244.
73. See Tokyo Electric Power Case, 182 SHIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU at 244.
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board level, viewing them as issues specific to their U.S. or other overseas
offices. Despite the court's emphasis on the board's responsibility to establish overall policies regarding internal controls, it never examined whether
Daiwa's board in fact did so. Had the court conducted such an examination, it presumably would have found that no overall risk management policy existed and, at least in theory, could have found all of the bank's
directors and statutory auditors liable for the bank's failure to establish
such a policy.

74

Instead, the court next turned to the specific question of whether
Daiwa's directors and auditors fulfilled their duties by creating an appropriate risk management system for the NY Branch. The court concluded
that Daiwa's system of internal controls was insufficient due to an inappro75
priate method of confirming custody account balances.
The court essentially utilized a negligence standard and focused on
whether there was any "neglect of job responsibility" by each of the defendants. By focusing on a narrow accounting issue, the court never directly
addressed the defendants' argument that the NY Branch had an adequate
system that Iguchi's unusually clever scheme managed to circumvent. On
the other hand, the court's utilization of a negligence standard may also be
viewed as an attempt to balance the plaintiffs' heavy evidentiary burden
76
with a lower standard of liability.
The absence of a fully consistent approach reflects the prior lack of
necessity to carefully consider the standard of liability, analysis of which
had previously been largely theoretical. With the Daiwa Bank Case decision providing the first instance of director liability in an oversight context,
or for that matter in any context outside of a narrow range of bribery cases,
this question is now the subject of active debate in Japan.

74. A general distinction exists between the courts' approach to director liability in
the United States, where it typically focuses on a director's action or inaction with
respect to a board resolution or to a board's failure to act, and Japan, where it tends to
focus on an individual director's supervising particular employees. For the former, see
infra sections IV. A & B; for the latter, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
75. The NY Branch utilized a typical reconciliation procedure by which it compared
the custodian's account statements with its own books and records. But since the custodian's account statements were obtained through Iguchi, this confirmation method left
room for concealment by a trader. The court emphasized that the confirmation of
account balances is the most basic and effective method of controlling the risk inherent
in the custody business and that it requires physical confirmation of securities or, as in
this case, where securities are undocumented book-entry securities it requires obtaining
account statements directly from the custodian actually holding the securities. Daiwa
Bank Case, at 39.
76. See Shinsaku Iwahara, Daiwa Ginko Daihyo SoshoJiken Isshin Hanketsu to Daihyo
Sosho Seido Kaisei Mondai [Trial Court Decision in the Daiwa Bank Derivative Suit Case
and Question of Revision of the Derivative Suit System (Part 1)], 1576 Si-oji HOMU 4, 12
(2000) (cautioning against a strict application of the burden of proof, under which plaintiffs could be required to prove that changes in the internal control system of Daiwa's NY
Branch would have prevented the trading losses, as such a requirement would make
proof of any internal control inadequacies extremely difficult).
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B. Second Case-Violation of Law and Administrative Guidance
In the Second Case, the court ruled that compliance with foreign law was
included in a director's duty of care and went on to find, based on negligence, that eleven directors breached their duties of care and loyalty for
specific illegal acts and the failure to report or to cause the representative
director to report to U.S. authorities. 77 The Commercial Code specifically
provides that directors shall be liable to the corporation for "any act which
violates any law, ordinance or the articles of incorporation. ' 78 There has
been an ongoing debate in Japan over whether the Japanese term for law
and ordinance, horei, was intended to cover all violations of law or only
certain "important" violations. 79 The Daiwa Bank court found that the
Commercial Code required compliance with foreign law if a company
expands its business overseas and establishes overseas offices. 80 Dismissing the defendants' argument that they did not know U.S. banking
laws and regulations, the court concluded that the defendants, as managers of a bank with U.S. operations, were negligent in their failure to investigate U.S. law in a timely manner. 8 1
Although there is no statutory basis in the Commercial Code or elsewhere requiring any deference to the business judgment of directors, Japanese courts have in fact afforded deference to business judgments. 8 2 While
77. Although the board of directors approved the plea bargain by passing a resolution and paying a $340 million criminal fine to U.S. authorities, no defendant was found
liable for approving or failing to object to the board's resolution. Rather, the court
examined the individual circumstances of each defendant and looked to see if and when
a defendant learned of the cover-up from the president, i.e. representative director, of
Daiwa and failed to exercise his duty as a director or auditor by objecting to the plan in a
timely manner. As no one objected to the plan, all of the directors who were involved in
formulating and implementing the cover-up were found to be liable. See Daiwa Bank
Case, at 43-44.
78. SHOHO art. 266-1-5.
79. The more popular view was that this concept was intended, as literally stated, to
cover all violations of law. See Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 53, at 23-24. However, there is some question as to the practical difference in result between these two
approaches, as they both presumably require at least negligence in order to find director's liability. The leading case in this area is the Nomura Securities Loss Compensation
Case, a derivative suit centering on Nomura's payments to certain large shareholders in
compensation for losses in their brokerage accounts. Although the Japanese FTC subsequently ruled that this practice violated Japanese antitrust law, the courts found no
director's liability because directors had no knowledge and presumably could not have
readily obtained knowledge that the action was illegal. The Supreme Court decision in
this case clearly embraced the "unlimited theory," deciding that violation of any law
would subject directors to liability. See Kameda v. Tabuchi, 54-6 MiNSHU 1767 (S.Ct.,
July 7, 2000), 1729 HANREI JiHO 28 (2000) [Nomura Securities Loss Compensation
Case]. Nevertheless, the Nomura Securities Loss Compensation Case suggested to some
that directors in Japan would not be held to a high standard for violations of law, which
were not "knowing" violations.
80. Daiwa Bank Case, at 42.
81. Id. at 47. The court was also unwilling to believe that the Daiwa directors were
unaware that filing false call reports with the FRB and creating false Bankers Trust
account statements was against U.S. law even if they were not completely familiar with
the detailed provisions. Id.
82. As the business judgment rule is not as clearly defined as in the United States,
Japanese commentators proposed many variations of standards which were utilized in
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the formulation of a standard for the business judgment rule remains an
issue in Japan, 8 3 most applications of the business judgment rule have
resulted in the rejection of directors' liability.
In the Daiwa Bank Case, the defendants contended that their conduct
involved difficult judgments relating to the bank's predicament, was done
in good faith and was within the discretion afforded to them by the business judgment rule. Despite ruling that the business judgment rule was
inapplicable, the court went on to formulate a standard for the business
judgment rule 84 and then reject the defendants' arguments for its application, even voicing doubts about Daiwa's intention to inform U.S. regulators
and the public about the incident. 8 5 It further concluded that Daiwa's
president and the other defendants "made an extremely unreasonable and
inappropriate business judgment as corporate business managers" in violation of their duties of care and loyalty. 86 The case thus sounds in gross
negligence, because the court found liability on the part of the defendants
regardless of the application or non-application of the business judgment
rule.
One of the most striking aspects of the Daiwa Bank Case, which is of
particular interest to American readers, is the court's departure from prior
practice concerning the bank's informal consultations with bureaucrats,
which are popularly referred to as "administrative guidance." The defendants in the Daiwa Bank Case sought to rely on administrative guidance
from the MOF to excuse the bank's failure to report its losses to U.S.
authorities in a timely manner. However, the Daiwa Bank court not only
rejected this argument, it also demonstrated a clear hostility to the practice
court decisions. Most Japanese commentators have advocated following an ALl-based
approach. Courts in Japan have tended to include in their business judgment standard
some examination of the reasonableness of the substantive business judgment. In
Japan, traditional views hostile to public disclosure of confidential corporate processes,
together with the absence of an effective discovery system, would make it difficult for the
plaintiffs or the court to have sufficient information on the decision-making process to
focus only on procedural issues as do courts in Delaware.
83. Although formulations differ somewhat, one oft-cited example of a standard for
the business judgment rule from the Tokyo district court's decision in the Nomura
Securities Loss Compensation Case looks at whether "a careless mistake in understanding of the factual premises of the decision was made or if the process of decision-making
based on these facts was markedly unreasonable as an ordinary businessman .
See
Nomura Securities Loss Compensation Case, at 1469 HANP.i JiHO 30.
84. The Daiwa Bank court emphasizes that directors must use discretion in making
business judgments, and accordingly, finding liability on the part of directors for breach
of the duty of care or loyalty requires "that, at the time the measure was taken, there was
an important and careless mistake in understanding of the factual premises of the director's decision or the process, substance of decision-making is especially unreasonable or
inappropriate as a business manager." See Daiwa Bank Case, at 45. Compared to past
formulations, the standard of the business judgment rule in the Daiwa Bank Case clearly
includes a review of the substance of decision-making to the same extent (i.e., reasonableness) as procedural aspects. Although this has been noted by Japanese commentators, as discussed above, it is unclear whether it would result in a different substantive
outcome under the Japanese system.

85. Id. at 46.
86. Id. at 47.
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and the underlying mindset of permitting corporate directors to follow government suggestions rather than make independent judgments in the best
interests of their corporation.
This regulatory practice of administrative guidance, utilized in conjunction with industrial policy, is largely responsible for the widespread
87
view that Japan has a "unique" culturally based administrative system.
However, administrative guidance is not a legal concept and has never been
satisfactorily defined.8 8 Although formulations differ, administrative guidance is generally described as government agencies obtaining informal
cooperation from industries, companies or individuals to take or refrain
from taking some action. 8 9 Despite its historical prevalence, businesses
and commentators in Japan have recently joined in the international call
for replacing administrative guidance in Japan with "transparent," rulebased administration. 90 Administrative practices in several important
87. See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, MIT] AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1982) (citing the
popularity of, but disagreeing with, this culturally based view). This view emphasizes
close government-business relations in Japan which are buttressed by the practice of
"amakudari,"whereby retired government bureaucrats join and play important roles in
private enterprises. Id. See Meryll Dean, Administrative Guidance in Japanese Law: A
Threat to the Rule of Law, J. Bus. L., Jul. 1991, at 398, 403 (1991) (defining administrative guidance as "a tool that provides maximum administrative flexibility within a framework of minimum legal formality and is sustained by a uniquely Japanese system of
consensus bonding.")
88. See generally Mitsuo Matsushita, The Legal Framework of Trade and Investment in
Japan, 27 HARV. INT'L. LJ. 361, 376 (1986). Attempts to formulate a legal definition
often wind up characterizing it by what it is not-it is not formal administrative action
(i.e., "shobun" or disposition) which would be subject to judicial review. See generally
John 0. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law, 19 LAW JAPAN 1 (1986). Even this assumption of non-reviewability by courts is challenged by Mark Ramseyer, who focuses on a
line of successful tort claims by real estate developers against local governments that
regulated development informally through administrative guidance. In his view, the real
issue is a political one, as informal administrative actions by leftist-dominated local governments are reviewed "brutally" by courts when such local actions "challenge the preferences of the ruling party." J. Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Administrative Guidance, in
FINANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS IN JAPAN 199 (Masahiko Aoki & Gary R.

Saxonhouse eds., 2000); see Takehisa Nakagawa, Administrative Informality in Japan:
Governmental Activities Outside Statutory Authorization, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 175, 205-07
(2000) (drawing a hypothetical analogy between ways American and Japanese courts
handle cases of administrative law).
89. As an example of the travails which beset a small businessman who attempted to
defy the bureaucracy, see Frank K. Uphham, Review Article, The Man Who Would
Import: A Cautionary Tale About Bucking the System in Japan, 17 J. JAPANESE STUD. 323
(1991) [reviewing TAUI SATO, ORE WA TSuSANSHO NI BARASARETA! (1986)]. American commentators analyzing Japanese regulatory tactics have tended to view administrative guidance as a form of private ordering which features bargaining and negotiation among
interested private parties. See generally Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 923 (1984); Frank K. Upham, Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in
Comparative and InternationalPerspective, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396 (1996).
90. For example, by the mid-1990s, Japan's leading business organization was publicly calling for "eliminating administrative guidance as much as possible" and for the
establishment of rule-making procedures which permit public participation. See
Keidanren, Request for Deregulation: Basic Philosophy, Oct. 28, 1996, available at http://
www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/po1054/basic.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003) (in
English).
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areas, such as financial services, have been reevaluated and modified in the
last few years. 9 1
There have also been a limited number of cases, like the Daiwa Bank
Case, where defendants sought to use administrative guidance to excuse
actions which otherwise would give rise to civil or criminal liability, particularly with respect to alleged violations of Japan's antimonopoly law.
However, in contrast to the outcome in the Daiwa Bank Case, defendants
were generally successful. Although courts ruled that informal administrative guidance had no legal effect, they nevertheless were sympathetic to
administrative guidance and ultimately relied on it as a significant factor in
92
finding no liability on the part of defendants.
In the Daiwa Bank Case, the Osaka District Court adopted a strikingly
hostile attitude towards administrative guidance. The defendants in the
Daiwa Bank Case did not claim that compliance with oral advice from the
MOF constituted an independent legal defense. Rather as in prior cases,
they contended that it should excuse their failure to disclose losses to U.S.
authorities in a timely manner as a legitimate exercise of their business
judgment. 9 3 The court rejected the defendants' argument that they were
bound by requests or suggestions from the MOF, ruling that there was
insufficient evidence that the MOF had taken any action based on its legal
authority. 94 The court criticized the defendants for attempting to "adhere
91. For example, the Financial Services Agency was established in 1998 in large part
due to a desire to have rule-based regulation and supervision over the banking, securities and insurance industries. In 1999, the agency published its first Bank Examination
Manual, in contrast to prior practice of maintaining secret internal regulations (naiki) on
such matters.
92. For example, in the well-known Oil Cartel Cases, courts found no liability in two
criminal and two civil lawsuits where defendants sought to use administrative guidance
to excuse violations of Japan's antimonopoly law. See generally Ramseyer, Costs of the
Consensual Myth, supra note 14. Translations of portions of decisions in the two criminal cases appear in J. Mark Ramseyer, The Oil Cartel Criminal Cases: Translations and
Postscript, 15 LAW JAPAN 57, 57-66 (1982); see also Upham supra note 15, at 184-88.
The leading recent case in this area is the Nomura Securities Loss Compensation
Case, in which the defendant directors cited administrative guidance by the Ministry of
Finance as leading them to believe that it was appropriate to provide compensation to
certain large customers for securities losses. Japanese courts cited this administrative
guidance as one factor in reaching the determination that Nomura directors were not
negligent and accordingly would not be liable in violating the Antimonopoly Law. See

Kameda v. Tabuchi, 54-6

MINSHU

1767 (S.Ct., July 7, 2000), 1729

HANREI JiHO

28

(2000) [Nomura Securities Loss Compensation Case].
93. Daiwa Bank Case, at 45.
94. There is no doubt that the MOF had the necessary legal authority, as like bank
regulators elsewhere it has broad discretion to regulate the "safety and soundness" of
banks and to issue legally enforceable orders based on such concerns. See GINKO HO
[Banking Law] (Law No. 59 of 1981) art. 26. Thus, this is not a case where the regulator
could be accused of relying on a broad enabling statute in order to assert administrative
authority over matters not clearly contemplated by law to fall within its jurisdiction. The
court characterizes the defendants' argument as being based on requests (y~b6) or suggestions (shisa) from the MOF but does not directly utilize such characterizations in its
own judgment. In this regard, it should be noted that prior cases involving administrative guidance, such as the oil cartel cases, tended to involve an entire industry, with the
guidance sometimes being in written form. By contrast, the Daiwa Bank Case involved
oral discussions with only one bank. Perhaps in order to compensate for this weakness,
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to unofficial local rules" despite the fact that the Japanese economy "has
been developing and expanding on a global scale" and for relying on the
government instead of fulfilling their role as directors by reaching their
95
own independent decisions.
Among Japanese commentators, the court's approach to causation and
damages was one of the most controversial aspects of the court's decision
among. 9 6 A lack of legal causation between director's acts and the resulting damages was a popular argument of defendants in shareholder derivative suits in Japan, and it was particularly so in the Daiwa Bank Case.
Defendants argued that $350 million dollars in damages were not foreseeable because they resulted from a plea bargain and the general U.S. doc97
trine of vicarious liability for which there are no Japanese equivalents.
However, the court found that legal causation existed, as it had already
found causation between the defendants' acts and their payment of the
U.S. criminal fine, and because there were no special circumstances such
"as the process and results of the plea bargain being markedly different
from that which is normally anticipated. "98
In calculating the amount of damages, the court looked specifically at
the liability of each defendant with respect to each count of the indictment.
Since the four representative directors were only involved in certain counts
(1-7) of the indictment, the court concluded that damages should be based
on each defendant's degree of contribution to the facts which gave rise to
the criminal penalty, rather than bearing joint and several liability for the
entire amount. Using this method, the court arrived at a number of $105
million for each of the defendants. 99
III.

Comparison with U.S. Law

A comparative look at similar U.S. cases and statutes illuminates some of
the policy considerations behind the court's decision and the issues that
will be debated in Japan in the aftermath of the Daiwa Bank Case. The
the defendants emphasized the crisis engulfing Japan's entire financial system as justification for the ministry's advice and their reliance on it.
95. Daiwa Bank Case, at 46.
96. See, e.g., Iwahara, supra note 76 (Part 1I), 1577 SHOJI HOMU 4, 8 (2000); Tatsuo
Uemura, Torishimariyaku ga tai Kaisha Sekinin wo Ou baai ni okeru Songai Baisho no
Hani [The Scope of Compensatory Damages in cases where a Director is liable to the
Corporation], 1600 SHOJI HOMU 4 (2001).
97. It was repeatedly argued that under Japanese law a corporation would not be
liable for the wrongdoing of an individual, and that actions such as false reports and
false entries in bank records would likely result only in a regulatory violation with a
modest administrative fine. See generally Ken Kawamura, Daiwa Ginko no Daihyo Sosho
Hanketsu ni Omou [Thinking about the Court Decision in the Daiwa Bank Derivative
Suit], TORISHIMARYAKU NO HOMU 4, 6 (Oct. 25, 2000). Another argument was that Japanese courts should refuse to enforce such a fine as being against Japanese public policy,
as had occurred in a prior case involving punitive damages in tort. Id.
98. Daiwa Bank Case, at 47.
99. The other defendants who were found liable were subject to a similar scrutiny,
with the results that three defendants were each liable for $70 million, one for $157.5
million and two for $245 million. Id. at 48.

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 36

significance of the Daiwa Bank Case in Japan might best be explained by
viewing its effect as equivalent to the combined impact of the two most
controversial cases in U.S. corporate law during the last twenty years, Smith
v. Van Gorkom' 0 0 in the 1980s and In re Caremark InternationalInc. Derivative Litigation'01 in the 1990s. As in these cases, unexpected findings of
new duties and actual liability in the Daiwa Bank Case upset well-established expectations concerning the previously limited grounds for directors' liability and generated tremendous controversy.
A.

Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule

Perhaps the best-known and most contentious court decision in U.S. corporate law is Van Gorkom, in which the Delaware Supreme Court found a
violation of the directors' duty of care in apparent disregard of the business
judgment rule. 10 2 The business community was greatly alarmed at the
apparent uncertainty the Van Gorkom decision created-with its potential
effects on the availability of directors' insurance and willingness of qualified candidates to serve as directors. The following year the Delaware legislature enacted a new charter exculpatory provision under which
corporations may limit director liability to certain specific circumstances
10 3
by adding a provision to the corporation's articles of incorporation.
Among the issues raised by Van Gorkom commentators, the question
of hindsight bias is highly relevant to the Daiwa Bank Case. A fundamental
underpinning of the business judgment rule is the concern about the adequacy of the litigation process to judge the reasonableness of directors'
decision-making in hindsight. The court in the Daiwa Bank Case acknowledged this danger and explicitly stated that it must not apply current standards concerning internal controls retroactively to Daiwa's directors during
the 1984-95 period. The Daiwa Bank court nevertheless found a breach of
directors' duties by narrowly focusing on a detailed aspect of internal controls that may not have been considered significant under the standards
prevailing during that period. It appears thatJapanese courts will now face
the same issues relating to standards for liability and the business judgment rule which have troubled U.S. courts,' 0 4 although recent legislation
100. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)
101. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
102. The Delaware Supreme Court found directors' liability based on gross negligence
due to the failure to make an informed judgment in approving a cash-out merger by
utilizing all material reasonably available. Despite a complex fact pattern, involved
issues of law, and being almost immediately overturned in Delaware by the legislature's
enactment of a new state exculpatory charter provision, this case continues to generate
wide comment and occupies the most prominent position in corporate law casebooks
with respect to a director's duty of care and the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Lawrence Hamermesh, Fiduciary Duty, Limited Liability and the Law of Delaware: Why I Do
Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477 (2000).
103. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §102(b)(7). This approach has been adopted with

some variation by most states and has been accepted by the model business corporation
act and the ALl.
104. In both countries, the business judgment rule represents legal doctrine that
seeks to achieve a balance between providing directors with discretionary authority to
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enacted in response to the Daiwa Bank Case has essentially institutionalized the business judgment rule in Japan.
Rather than legal doctrine, however, the comparison with Van Gorkom
is most relevant in relation to the broad impact of the court's decision on
business, legislatures and markets. In both the Daiwa Bank Case and Van
Gorkom the prior perception of business was that prevailing standards of
liability were sufficient to avoid directors' liability in instances where directors were simply exercising their normal business judgment. Liability
would only occur in exceptional cases which did not merit the protection
of the business judgment rule in the U.S. or which represented instances of
clear misconduct by directors in Japan. Both the Daiwa Bank Case and Van
Gorkom cast serious doubt on the proposition that the small subset of
derivative suits that are likely to result in directors' liability was well-established and stable. Similarly, intense reaction by businesses, adoption of
new legislation to curb derivative suits, and significant change in insurance
markets occurred in both countries.
B. Caremark, Compliance and the Duty of Oversight
The other highly relevant U.S. case is Caremark, which is the leading Delaware case on the oversight/monitoring component of a director's duty of
care.' 0 5 A decade after Van Gorkom, the Caremark decision shocked the
business community by creating a new potential liability for corporate
directors-an affirmative duty of oversight to "attempt in good faith to
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board
concludes is adequate, exists."'1 6 This might be functionally similar to the
make business judgments and providing an incentive to ensure good faith performance
of their duties. The difficulties in formulating and implementing a standard to achieve
this balance are reflected in the widespread criticism of concepts such as "negligence" or

"gross negligence" on the basis that they represent ex post characterizations of director
behavior which do not provide sufficient certainty or enough of a "safe harbor" in light
of the broad discretion directors are expected to exercise. This dilemma goes far in
explaining the procedural emphasis in Van Gorkom and the ongoing debate over what
extent, if any the business judgment rule covers the substance of business decisions.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
105. Like the Daiwa Bank Case, Caremark involved directors failing to monitor violations of law and the resulting payment of substantial criminal and civil fines of some
$250 million. In approving a proposed settlement, the Chancellor found that it was a
director's duty to create reporting systems that will allow the board to make informed
judgments with respect to compliance with law. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
106. Id. at 970. In finding an affirmative duty of oversight, the Delaware Chancellor
characterized the prior Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. decision as a reliance case in
which directors and executors may assume the honesty of employees absent any grounds
for suspicion. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). Having established a duty of care, the Chancellor then proceeded to emphasize how difficult
it would be to prove a violation of this duty generally and the "very low probability" of
plaintiffs proving their case on the merits. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. As Caremark
had enacted an exculpatory charter provision, presumably the only basis for liability
would be a knowing violation of law or a lack of good faith; neither was found in the
case. Id. The Chancellor nevertheless approved the proposed settlement as providing a
benefit to the corporation. Id. at 972. The only immediate consequence of the litigation
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requirement in the Daiwa Bank Case that the board of directors establish
policies with respect to internal controls and compliance with law. Any
overall policy adopted at the board level would presumably consist of a
brief mission statement followed by a division of responsibilities among
management and some system for the board to receive reports. It would
thus be relatively brief and primarily procedural in nature, although
requiring a board resolution would assure that the board was involved in
the initial division of responsibilities and relevant procedures.
It is interesting to note that the Chancellor in Caremark found no
knowing violation of law despite a number of indictments and substantial
fines. In addition to the board having overseen the establishment and
implementation of appropriate compliance and ethics policies, the Chancellor also found that there was no complicity by the board or senior management in any wrongdoing, 10 7 and that there was consultation with, and
appropriate reliance on the advice of outside counsel with respect to the
corporation's contracting practices. 10 8 Daiwa's practices may have failed
on all these counts.
While setting forth a general rule concerning a director's duty of corporate monitoring, the Caremark case also made clear that it would be difficult to establish directors' liability. Liability for failure to act would only
occur if the plaintiffs were successful in establishing the directors "utter
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system." 10 9 In the First Case, which dealt with trading losses, 110 the Daiwa
Bank court found liability for four defendants and damages for one director in this type of situation, seemingly going beyond U.S. court decisions to
date. In the Second Case, which dealt with violation of law,"' the Daiwa
Bank court found liability for a violation of law without reference to the
business judgment rule. Unlike Caremark, Daiwa was not aided by its ex
post and seemingly grudging consultation with lawyers-a subject of great
importance to which I now turn.

may have been an award for the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees of $816,000 plus $53,000 in
expenses, because even though the settlement was approved its substance did not have a
real impact on Caremark. Id.
107. The Chancellor emphasized a stipulation in sentencing in one of the indictments
that "no senior executive of Caremark participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of wrongdoing in connection with the home infusion business practices."
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 965.
108. See id. at 971. With respect to knowing violation of the statute, the Chancellor's
decision notes that "the Board appears to have been informed by experts that the company's practices, while contestable, were lawful. There is no evidence that reliance on
such reports was not reasonable." Justified reliance on the advice of outside legal counsel thereby assures that there was no knowing violation of law which would give rise to

director's liability. Id.
109. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
110. Daiwa Bank Case, at 40-41 [Ko case or "First Case"].
111. Daiwa Bank Case, at 47 [Otsu case or "Second Case"].
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Role of Outside Experts

One striking comparison between the U.S. cases and the Daiwa Bank Case
is the issue of the directors' use of outside counsel and other experts in
reaching board decisions or exercising oversight functions. U.S. law allows
the use of outside experts, if they are selected with due care and relied
upon in good faith. 1 2 In Van Gorkom, while the Delaware Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the notion that the board was required to obtain an
outside expert's opinion of the fair value of Trans Union's shares,' 13 it nevertheless seems clear that such outside advice would have been important
in assuring that the board reached an informed decision. Similarly, in
Caremark the Chancellor cited the board's consultation with its legal counsel as evidence that its directors were highly unlikely to have been found
114
liable for monetary damages for a breach of their duty of oversight.
New emphasis on effective compliance programs that adhere to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as well as a greater direct role for the board in oversight
of compliance policies clearly imply the potential for an even greater role
for legal counsel in formulating, implementing, and monitoring compliance policies.
By any measure, Japanese corporate governance has not traditionally
emphasized consultation with outside experts to aid a board of directors in
making board decisions or in otherwise fulfilling its fiduciary obligations
to the corporation. On the contrary, when Japan appeared all-powerful in
the 1980s, Japanese business leaders regularly cited Americans' overemphasis on lawyers and neglect of product quality and manufacturing
processes as a major obstacle to their international competitiveness. The
practices of administrative guidance discussed above left little room for the
application of formal legal rules and, accordingly, no significant role for
lawyers. Traditional views of maintaining strict confidentiality for business information also militated against early and effective consultation
with lawyers.
Prior to the collapse of the bubble economy and the increase in derivative litigation which began in 1993, there was no particular need to consider the issue of legal advice as a matter of law or practice. Thereafter, the
use of outside counsel by corporate managers and boards in Japan began to
gradually increase. Legal doctrine also began to develop, particularly in
the late 1990s, culminating with the Daiwa Bank court's recognition of
directors' right of reliance on other directors, statutory auditors, and
employees. The Daiwa Bank court was the first court to deal with the the
issue of reliance on outside counsel.
112. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(e) (1991); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(c)
(1984) (expressly preventing a director from "hiding his head in the sand" when he has
actual knowledge that would make his reliance upon certain information, opinions,
reports or statements unwarranted).
113. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)
114. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. In Van Gorkom, the defendants also argued that
they approved the proposed transaction upon advice of counsel, but the court rejected
their contention. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 880.
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The clash between traditional business attitudes and changing practices and legal doctrine are evident in the Daiwa Bank Case. The bank felt
no need to consult with counsel in Japan upon discovery of the trading
losses in July of 1995, since its responsibility would depend on its informal
relations with the MOF. There was also little initial focus on U.S. law,
other than the desirability of avoiding it by moving the losses out of the
United States and the jurisdiction of U.S. regulators. Daiwa officials in
Japan consulted with U.S. counsel indirectly in late August and directly in
early September, but only after being urged to do so by the bank's U.S.
headquarters.
One irony of the Daiwa Bank Case is that timely and full consultation
with a U.S. lawyer may have allowed Daiwa to escape both expulsion from
the United States and criminal liability. 115 A second even greater irony is
that in the derivative suit in Japan Daiwa argued that its directors should
not be liable for violations of U.S. law because they did consult with U.S.
counsel concerning their proposed timetable for the disclosure of losses to
U.S. bank regulators and that they tried in good faith to comply with U.S.
law following consultation with an attorney. The court rejected Daiwa's
argument, essentially characterizing the consultation with U.S. lawyers as
being "too little, too late" in light of the unusual trading loss. Finally, as
discussed above, the Daiwa Bank court gave short thrift to the defendants'
excuse of administrative guidance, and went on to castigate the defendants
for attempting to rely on informal agency advice rather than fulfilling their
fiduciary duty to make an independent judgment in the best interests of
1 6
the corporation.'
If cynics call Van Gorkom a decision calling for "full employment for
investment bankers," both the Caremark and Daiwa Bank Case decisions
could similarly be characterized as full employment measures for lawyers.
In the Daiwa Bank Case, the question of consultation with lawyers arose in
the broader context of the defendants' intent or negligence in the violation
of U.S. law, rather than directly as a right of reliance issue. Nevertheless,
the Daiwa Bank Case discusses this question for the first time, creating an
expectation that such reliance would likely be permitted. Whatever the
precise formulation or application of such a right of reliance, 1 17 it would
undoubtedly prove quite valuable to defendants in derivative suits and
might change corporate practices in Japan regarding the use of outside
experts, which are explored in Part IV.
115. If Daiwa had promptly reported Iguchi's crimes and cooperated with U.S.
authorities, it "stood a very good chance of never being indicted." See Steven A. Miller,
How Daiwa Self-Destructed, 113 BANKING .J. 560, 575 (1996). This would require, however, Daiwa to have consulted with U.S. counsel on a timely basis and to have been
prepared both to provide the necessary factual information to counsel and abide by the
resulting legal advice. See id.
116. Nishimura v. Abekawa, 1573 SHOJI HOMU 3, 46 (Osaka Dist. Ct., 2000) [Daiwa
Bank Case].
117. The few cases in Japan that discuss the right of reliance do not contain any
qualifiers concerning the reasonableness or good faith in the exercise of such reliance.
See Iwahara, supra note 76, at 13-14.
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Role of Courts and Legal System

The conundrum of directors' liability-how to allow directors to proceed
unhindered with their business responsibilities but nevertheless provide an
incentive for good faith performance-may be largely responsible for the
current state of derivative suit practice in the United States. As previously
noted with respect to Delaware courts, it is not necessary for courts to rule
in favor of plaintiff shareholders in order to influence corporate behavior.' 18 Courts enunciate principles that could theoretically lead to director's liability, at least under an egregious fact pattern. In reality, significant
procedural and substantive barriers, such as the demand requirement and
the business judgment rule (including exculpatory charter statutes) mean
that plaintiffs lose the bulk of derivative suits at an early stage based on
defendants' motion to dismiss, often with no or only limited discovery.
The few cases that survive a motion to dismiss are generally settled by the
defendant directors because directors, including outside directors, would
be subject to the full burden of discovery by being called as witnesses
despite their limited knowledge of the subject matter. Further, settlement
in which directors typically admit no liability or wrongdoing virtually
assures that the corporation's indemnity of the directors and Directors and
Officers' (D&O) liability insurance will take effect.
This pattern in the United States has led to the widespread criticism
that the derivative suit system does not effectively improve corporate governance.1 |9 However, any court decision which is seen as departing from
this pattern and opening up new potential avenues for director's liability
can have an outsized impact. One could argue that Van Gorkom, Caremark,
and Daiwa Bank were all unusual cases that should not be of undue concern to a conscientious board.' 20 Yet, these cases invoked tremendous corporate responses, including legislative efforts to limit directors' liability,
because they appeared to threaten industry's perceived certainty of the
standard of liability.
118. See generally Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997).
119. See Romano, supra note 9.
120. Van Gorkom involved an egregious fact pattern and the liability found there
could presumably have been avoided by modest information gathering and consultation
with outside experts. The Delaware Chancellor approved the Caremark settlement only
because it did not involve director's liability for compensatory damages and contained
measures concerning compliance policies that were consistent with corporate initiatives
already underway at the time. Daiwa also involves egregious facts, which are unlikely to
be repeated. In addition, the outcomes of the latter two cases were also affected by their
procedural posture. If Caremark had been judged on the merits, rather than as approval
of a settlement, it is possible that there would not be a duty of oversight in Delaware law
today. Similarly, the Daiwa Bank Case first went to the Osaka high court in the form of
a security for expenses motion by the defendants, which if granted, as had been done by
the district court, would have resulted in the dismissal of a well-known and significant
suit (a huge banking scandal with acknowledged criminal liability) without giving plaintiffs their day in court. Instead, the high court recognized that the duty of oversight
included a duty to formulate an overall policy of internal controls, thereby deciding that
the plaintiffs' pleadings were sufficient for that stage of the litigation and allowing the
case to proceed on the merits.
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Viewed in a positive light, these court decisions could have an educational effect by improving corporate governance practices. Executives'
strong reaction to and fear of such cases, combined with the role of lawyers
in advising corporations on new risks and preventative measures, can act
12 1
as an important tool for improving corporate governance practices.
Although some claim that lawyers overstate such risks when advising corporate clients, 1 22 one would expect clients to pay close attention to any
potential risk, no matter how remote, of personal liability that would not
be subject to corporate indemnification. Regardless of whether Delaware
courts consciously count on this effect when rendering decisions, the
result is that corporate governance practices can be affected and presumably improved by means of a very small number of cases which find potential or actual liability on the part of directors.
From their published opinions it is generally difficult to ascertain the
presence of a similar role for Japanese courts. Their judgments are generally short, do not cite court precedents other than Supreme Court cases,
and rarely engage in the kind of policy discussions which are fairly common in U.S. decisions. For example, the court in the Daiwa Bank Case,
unlike the Caremark court, 123 does not justify the imposition of a duty of
oversight by discussing any underlying legal and societal changes. Instead,
the Daiwa Bank court treats the duty of oversight as established law. However, something clearly is going on in the Daiwa Bank Case-it is unlikely a
coincidence that a decision that grants an enormous damage award based
on a duty of oversight for the first time is also an amazingly lengthy decision, particularly by Japanese standards. 124 One certainly suspects that
the Daiwa Bank court had motivations, akin to those sometimes ascribed to
Delaware courts, of setting corporate norms and showing the "bad" behavior of defendants to legitimize its exercise of judicial power. 1 25 The role of
the Daiwa Bank court is also striking in light of the more conservative
approach of Japanese courts to date in somewhat analogous circum121. See Rock, supra note 118; see also Deborah A. DeMott, OrganizationalIncentives
To Care About the Law, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1997, at 39, n. 102 (1997).
122. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role
of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997).
123. In support of his view, the Chancellor cited three changes since the Graham
decision of 1963: (1) the seriousness of the board's role in corporate law under Delaware
case law; (2) the necessity of the board's obtaining information in order to fulfill its
basic management function under Delaware corporate law; and (3) the federal organizational sentencing guidelines which raised the stakes with respect to corporate compliance with law and increased the importance of corporate reporting systems. In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969-70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
124. The court's decision was over 300 pages or some 50 printed pages when
reprinted in legal journals. This is probably some ten times the length of a typical court
decision in Japan.
125. See Rock, supra note 118; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985) [Trans Union Case]. The Daiwa Bank court highlights the defendants' inappropriate behavior, explicitly expressing skepticism, for example, that the bank's management
ever intended to report the bank's losses to U.S. regulators. See Nishimura v. Abekawa,
1573 SHOJI HOMU 3, 45 (Osaka Dist. Ct., 2000) [Daiwa Bank Case].
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stances. 126 U.S. commentators have
already noted the educational role of
12 7
the Daiwa Bank court's decision.
IV.
A.

Aftermath of the Daiwa Bank Case
The Shareholder Derivative Suit System

The Daiwa Bank Case will have a significant impact on the functioning of
Japan's shareholder derivative suit system in the two related areas of pleadings and settlement. Prior to the Daiwa Bank Case, many derivative suits
were dismissed on the basis of a defendant's demand for plaintiffs to post
security for expenses. Substantial amounts awarded under this rubric at
the pleading stage ended the litigation before it started. The standard for
granting security for expenses went beyond the doctrine's stated purpose
of weeding out abusive litigation and substantially burdened plaintiffs in
Japan where corporate information is closely guarded and not generally
available. The Osaka high court's reversal of the district court's decision
granting the defendants' demand for security for expenses is a significant
precedent for other plaintiffs in derivative suits because it may encourage
courts to apply the prevailing standard flexibly so as not to end seemingly
non-abusive suits at a preliminary stage.
Similarly, the Daiwa Bank Case will also likely affect Japanese practices concerning the settlement of derivative litigation. As noted above, one
popular view of U.S. practice is for defendants to quickly settle the relatively small number of derivative suits that survive defendants' motions to
dismiss. In Japan, on the other hand, defendants have displayed a willingness to settle only a limited set of cases, namely those involving director
misconduct where plaintiffs had a realistic chance of victory in court. Following this prevailing practice, the defendants in the Daiwa Bank Case
were not prepared to settle allegations relating to violation of a duty of
oversight, even after the plaintiffs' suit survived the defendants' motion for
security for expenses.
126. It is interesting to contrast the approach taken by the Daiwa court with the earlier Nomura Securities Loss Compensation Case. See Kameda v. Tabuchi, 54-6 MINSHU
1767 (S. Ct., July 7, 2000), 1729 HANREI JIHO 28 (2000) [Nomura Securities Loss Com-

pensation Case]. Both cases presumably represent relatively new areas-internal controls and compliance with law in the Daiwa Bank Case and treating all securities
customers equally in the Nomura Securities Loss Compensation Case-in which Japanese corporate practices should be improved. The Nomura Securities courts took a conservative approach, declining to find director liability for a number of reasons, including
the MOF's administrative guidance. Perhaps the courts felt secure in the knowledge
that, in any event, Japanese securities laws were already amended to outlaw the practice
on a prospective basis and, incidentally, remove any possible defense of lack of knowledge of a violation of law in any future derivative actions. In reality, however, despite the
change of law, Japan has continued to be plagued by cases in which securities companies compensate favored customers for losses. One suspects that the additional factor of
a finding of individual director's liability in the derivative suit would have aided in altering this corporate practice.
127. See Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction, supra note 22, at 2116 (including a
discussion of the Daiwa Bank Case in this context).
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One would expect that the previously prevailing Japanese practice
would become somewhat more like existing U.S. practice-a quick settlement would at least be considered for any suit that survives or that is likely
to survive defendants' demand for security for expenses. This change
already appears to be occurring. Following the court's decision in the
Daiwa Bank Case, the defendants in the well-known Sumitomo copper trading scandal quickly agreed to a substantial settlement. 128
Subsequently, settlement was also reached quickly in the appeal of the
Daiwa Bank Case itself by means of an in-court compromise. 129 The settlement was spurred by a looming reorganization of Daiwa Bank, thus raising
the possibility that plaintiffs would lose their standing in the derivative
suit. 1 30

As a result, in order to preserve the legal findings concerning

directors' liability in the district court decision, plaintiffs accepted a total
amount in damages of some 250 million yen ($2.08 million), a significantly lower amount than had been anticipated. 1 3 1 However, the plaintiffs
128. The settlement agreement and related materials are reprinted in 205 SHIRYOBAN
SHOJI HOMU 162 (2001). In this well-known case, a Sumitomo Corporation employee,
Yasuo Hamanaka, caused some $2.2 billion (280 billion yen) in losses due to copper
trading. Shareholders filed a derivative suit against the representative director (for 200
billion yen) and four other directors (for 100 million yen each) alleging breach of duty of
care with respect to the trading loss. The suit was originally filed in the Osaka District
Court on April 8, 1997. Settlement negotiations began upon the court's recommendation in November 2000 (shortly after the district court's decision in the Daiwa Bank
Case in September of that year). The five defendants, while denying legal liability,
agreed to pay 430 million yen ($3.58 million) in settlement. The company also
announced reforms of its procedures for general shareholders' meetings (the derivative
action was filed following the company's failure to explain the trading scandal at its
general shareholders' meeting in June 1996). Id.
129. Wakai Chosho [Settlement Agreement] 2000, No. 3654, 3655 shareholder derivative suit, joint litigation participation appeal case (Osaka High Ct., Dec. 10, 2001),
reprinted in 1618 SHOJi HOMU 44 (2002).
130. The holding company structure is relatively new in Japan. The Commercial
Code has no provision concerning the position of a shareholder in a derivative suit that,
due to reorganization, ceases to be a shareholder of the defendant corporation and
instead becomes a shareholder of a new holding company. In a recent case of first
impression involving the Industrial Bank of Japan converting to a subsidiary of Mizuho
Holdings Co. Ltd., the Tokyo District Court, in a literal interpretation of article 267(1) of
the Commercial Code, ruled that the plaintiff lost its status as a shareholder upon the
corporate reorganization. See Tatsuya v. Kurosawa (IBJ case), 205 SHIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU
109 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Mar. 29, 2001).
It was widely recognized that this decision led to the undesirable result that directors
could escape liability in shareholder derivative suits, and that this might have been
avoided by a broader interpretation of the Commercial Code requirement for being a
shareholder. Nevertheless, this was also considered an appropriate interpretation of the
existing code provision. See, e.g., Mugi Sekido, Saikin no Daihyo Sosho no Hanrei kara
[From Recent Court Decisions in Derivative Litigation], 553 JICPA J. 48, 50 (2001);
Kabunishi Daihyo Sosho Q&A: Daihyo Sosho chu no Mochikabu Gaisha e no Iko [Shareholder Derivative Suit Questions and Answers: Change to Holding Company during

Derivative Litigation] 1616

KIN YU HOMU

JiJo 61 (2001).

131. According to press reports, the judges in the Osaka high court proposed a total
damage award in the range of one to two billion yen ($8-16 million). This amount may
have been based on the view that the settlement amount should exceed the amount in
the Sumitomo copper trading case and on the financial resources of the forty-nine
defendants. In an unusual development, defendants rejected the court's proposal; ulti-
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succeeded in their original purpose of having all forty-nine defendants
make some payment, as opposed to merely the eleven directors found liable
in the district court's decision.
This anticipated change in settlement practices is noteworthy because
the internal monitoring model of Japanese corporate governance affords no
possible role to external monitoring by derivative suits utilizing the formal
legal system. The Daiwa Bank court's finding of a violation of the duty of
oversight based on a standard of negligence and a violation of foreign law,
despite governmental administrative guidance, together with the recordbreaking damage awards, should have a real impact on settlement practices. Further, these aspects of the Daiwa Bank Case give derivative litigation the potential to have an impact on corporate governance practices in
Japan.
B. Changes in Corporate Practices
It is difficult to measure in any definitive way the effect of the Daiwa Bank
Case on corporate practices, since any changes in such practices are ongoing and are a result of multiple causes. Nevertheless, we can easily identify
areas of expected change and at least point to anecdotal evidence, which
suggests that such changes may well be occurring. As in the Caremark
case, corporations appear to be responding to the Daiwa Bank Case in three
areas: (1) a greater emphasis on compliance policies and internal controls;
(2) a greater involvement by the board of directors in this area; and (3) a
greater involvement by outside counsel with respect to both the substance
of compliance policies and the relevant procedures, including board
involvement. As in the United States, there has been a wealth of articles
and seminars advising corporations on methods of improving their compliance policies and internal controls. The Daiwa Bank Case has been featured prominently, not only in the mass media, but also in business law
publications. 1 3 2 Shortly after the Daiwa Bank Case, a prominent Japanese
private group announced an overall revision of its principles of corporate
governance, which included a new principle on internal controls and intermately the plaintiffs accepted a settlement on financial terms proposed by the defendants just two days prior to the date of incorporation of Daiwa Bank's new holding
company. However, plaintiffs rejected the defendants' demand for a denial of liability in
the settlement agreement which instead is silent on defendants' liability. See Mochikabu
Gaisha Semari Kyuten Chokka [Pressured by Holding Company; Sudden Plummet in
Amount],

NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN,

Dec. 12, 2001, at 39.

132. For example, the court decision was reprinted in its lengthy entirety in a special
issue of the leading business law journal (SHoJI HOMU), despite also appearing in a
related publication which reprints relevant court decisions (SHIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU). It
is true that commentators and legal journals had been emphasizing the importance of
compliance issues since the Daiwa scandal first arose in 1995, and were also tracking
litigation trends on director's liability. A number of them, including SHOJI HOMU, told its
readers that they should not be surprised by the result in the Daiwa Bank Case. See
Daiwa Bank Case (preface), 1573 SHOJI HOMU at 3. However, it was nevertheless a great
shock to the business community and the public at large, partially due to the enormous
amount of damages. I cannot recall any other recent case which commanded the entire
cover of an issue of SHOJI HOMU.
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nal audit inspired largely by the decision. 133
A closely related issue is whether Japan has the additional transmission mechanism provided by a corporate bar advising its clients. The traditional image of a Japanese attorney, i.e., a solo practitioner who focuses on
domestic litigation, shows little promise in fulfilling such a corporate role.
The modest increase in the number of lawyers and legal professionals in
the 1990s would seem insufficient, despite the now widespread recognition
that much more needs to be done. 13 4 However, it appears that preventive
legal counseling is increasingly being provided both by traditional domestic attorneys' 35 and the steadily growing number of Japanese lawyers who
work at large internationally oriented law firms.
Corporations generally, and banks in particular, are being advised to
formulate their overall compliance framework and procedures in a general
policy approved by the board of directors, and there is evidence that attorneys are becoming more actively involved in such matters. A recent wellknown example is the decision by Nomura Securities to add two outsiders
to their board of directors-one of them being the best-known Japanese
attorney in the area of corporate law and governance practices.
Although there is some anecdotal evidence of increased consultation
with corporate lawyers as a direct result of the Daiwa Bank Case, t 36 I con133. See Nihon Koporeto Gabanansu Foramu, Nihon Koporeto linkai, Kaitei Koporeto
Gabanansu Gensoku [Corporate Governance Committee, Corporate Governance Forum,
Revised Principles of Corporate Governance] (Nov. 2001), reprinted in 1612 SHoJI HOMU
8 (2001). New principle eleven is entitled "Internal Controls" and calls for the relevant
corporate organs to strengthen the internal control and internal audit functions, with the
CEO taking the lead and the audit committee of the board of directors whose creation is
called for in the principles reviewing such policies. Id. at 21. An accompanying article
by the principal drafter of the revised principles cites the Financial Services Agency's
examination manuals for financial institutions (1999) and the Daiwa Bank Case (Sept.
2000) as reasons for the principles' emphasis on internal controls and internal audit.
See Tatsuo Uemura, Kaitei Koporeto Gabanansu Gensoku no Tokucho [Characteristics of
the Revised Principles of Corporate Governance], 1612 SHOJI HOMU 4, 7 (2001). The
examination manuals are available on the FSA's website. www.fsa.go.jp (general) or
www.fsa.go.jp/manual/manualj/yokin.pdf.
134. Changes in the importance of legal professionals in the 1990s could be measured in any number of ways: the increase in the number of lawyers, increase in the
number of legal department staff in corporations, the current plan to overhaul the Japanese legal education system and establish graduate-level "law schools" in 2004, etc. For
an approach which measures this trend by analyzing examination rates for the bar exam
and the elite public servants' exam, see Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law's
Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites in Japan (forthcoming, LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
2003).
135. The potential for a change in the role of Japanese lawyers was recognized by
some at an early stage. See Takao Tanase, The Urbanizationof Lawyers and Its Functional
Significance: Expansion in the Range of Work Activities and Change in Social Role, 13 LAW
JAPAN 20 (1983) (arguing that the high concentration of lawyers in the metropolises of
Tokyo and Osaka was due to the attractive prospect of expanding their traditional range
of work activities and social role).
136. For example, a number of lawyers who deal with derivative litigation and corporate governance issues reported a large number of inquiries following the Daiwa Bank
Case. See, e.g., Kyogaku Baisho, Boei e Kigyo Hashiru- Sonpo, Gendogakuage ni Nanshoku
[Huge Damage Amounts, Companies Run to Defend-Casualty Insurance, Reluctance to
Raise Coverage Amounts], NIHON KEIZAI SHiNBUN, Oct. 23, 2000. Although many compa-
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sider it to be a dramatic exclamation point to an existing trend by Japanese
corporations to improve corporate governance through consultation and
the adoption of more formal, rule-based policies.1 37 Such trend would
include the reform of general shareholders' meetings, 138 dealings with
40
sokaiya,139 and a gradual increase in the role of lawyers.'
C. Explosion in Demand for D&O Insurance
While exact data are unavailable, 14 1 public and industry sources provide
clear evidence of a sudden surge in demand for D&O insurance following
nies consulted with outside experts following the Daiwa Bank Case, such experts were
not necessarily lawyers. The Daiwa Bank Case involved issues of both compliance and
internal controls, the latter being an area of expertise of accountants and business
consultants.
137. This trend is related to the bursting of the bubble economy and the resulting
greater appreciation of the risk inherent in business transactions, together with the corresponding need to take measures to limit such risk and avoid potential corporate and
individual responsibility for bad business decisions. The increase in derivative litigation
in the 1990s is also a factor in leading to both a new perception of risk and changes in
corporate governance.
138. These days, one is more likely to find some genuine give-and-take between shareholders and management as opposed to past practices where management routinely
packed the meetings with employees and friendly sokaiya and gave a scripted performance. For example, when asked if he had noticed any change in such practices, one
manager at a large utility responded that "for the past five years, practices have been
changing every year." Interview with Hiroyuki Kobayashi, Manager, Chubu Electric
Power Co. Inc., in Nagoya, Japan (Nov. 6, 2001). This was also the immediate cause of,
and a major point of contention in, derivative litigation related to the Sumitomo Copper
Trading Case. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
139. As a general matter, companies had already reformed their relationships with
sokaiya prior to the Daiwa Bank Case as a result of previous derivative litigation involving bribes to sokaiya. Interview with Toshiaki Yuki, Manager, Osaka Gas Co. Ltd., in
Osaka, Japan (Dec. 2001).
140. Although only a portion of the lawyers I interviewed reported any new legal
consultations resulting directly from the Daiwa Bank Case, they unanimously cited a
general underlying trend in which Japanese corporations more frequently consulted
with lawyers. One aspect of this trend has been the increasing use of legal opinions for
both proposed board actions and business transactions generally in light of the heightened perception of risk. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. In some cases,
lawyers were even asked to confirm that a proposed board action constituted a valid
exercise of the board's business judgment. Interview with Koichi Takeuchi, Partner,
Nagashima, Ohno & Tsunematsu, in Tokyo, Japan (Jan. 17, 2002). I am not aware of
any instance where the legal implication of such an opinion was tested in court.
141. Aggregate industry data, published annually by the trade association of property/casualty insurers can be found at the website of the Marine & Fire Insurance Association of Japan, Inc., at http://www.sonpo.or.jp/english/english.html (last visited Apr.
6, 2003). Although industry data are itemized for most lines of insurance such as automobile insurance for example, D&O insurance is included in the catchall "miscellaneous" category. As a result, each insurance company regards its data as highly
confidential. The reason for this treatment of D&O insurance is not clear. Even prior to
the Daiwa Bank Case, D&O insurance premiums for the industry as a whole were substantial, and were widely reported to reach some 7.4 billion yen ($61.7 million) a year.
See, e.g., Tai Kabusushi Daihyo Sosho no Hokenryo, Sakunendo 74 Oku Yen de Kako Saiko
ni, Kigyo, Boei ni Kuryo [Insurance Premiums for Shareholder Derivative Suits, 7.4 billion yen last year is the Highest to Date, Companies Worried about Defense], NIHON
KEIZAI SHINBUN, Aug. 5, 1999. One could speculate that the industry's reticence is based
on a combination of warnings from commentators and others that insurance companies
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the Daiwa Bank Case, which overwhelmed the capacity of Japan's insurance industry. Initially introduced in 1993, D&O insurance previously
occupied an unimportant role in Japan. There were a number of reasons
for its initial unpopularity. First, the U.S.-inspired basic form for D&O
insurance was complex and contained numerous exemptions from coverage. 142 Further, payouts by insurance companies under D&O policies
were rare because defendants typically won derivative suits, often winning
on preliminary motions and without any settlement. Given the increase in
derivative litigation and the amounts claimed therein, the percentage of
large Japanese corporations who obtained some kind of D&O coverage
gradually increased to an estimated 80% of listed companies during the
1990s. 143 However, these corporations often obtained minimal amounts of
coverage. Their coverage typically ranged from 500 million-1 billion yen
144
($4.2-8.3 million) for the entire board.
The "Daiwa shock" fundamentally changed Japanese corporations'
perceptions concerning the necessity of D&O insurance. Despite the rapidly rising cost of insurance premiums after the Daiwa Bank Case, there
were huge increases in the coverage levels. Large companies often
requested ten times their previous amount of coverage, and a substantial
number of companies sought coverage for the first time. 145 This increased
should be cautious in "rescuing" directors for "bad" acts, and the high profitability of
D&O insurance to date is due to the rarity of payouts.
142. D&O insurance was first introduced in Japan through the hurried joint efforts of
Mitsui Fire & Marine, Co., Ltd. and AIG. The two companies directly translated AIG's
form into Japanese. The form was approved by the MOF and, at the time, bound all
other insurers in Japan to use the same form. See Kabunushi Daihy6 Sosho to Kaisha
Yakuin Baisho Sekinin Hoken (D&O Hoken) no Kaisetsu [Commentary on Shareholder
Derivative Suits and Directors Liability Insurance (D&O Insurance)] (Mitsui Kaijo Kasai
Hoken Kabushiki Gaisha ed., 1994) [Mitusi Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. ed.] (providing a complete commentary on the standard D&O insurance form); Nobuhiro Awaji,
Kabunishi Daihyo Sosho to Yakuin Baisho Sekinin Hoken no Shikumi [The Structure of
Shareholder Derivative Suits and Directors Liability Insurance], in KABUNUSHI DAIHYO
SOSHo TAIKEI [Structure of Shareholder Derivative Suits] 353 (Hideyuki Kobayashi &
Mitsuo Kondo eds., 1996) (providing a general introduction to D&O insurance in
Japan). For a look at the standard D&O insurance form, see Awaji, supra, at 403.
143. See, e.g., Kyogaku Baisho, supra note 136.
144. An additional reason for the low coverage limits was that the payment of insurance premiums were typically split 90% for the corporation and 10% by the individual
directors, and there was reluctance to add to the financial burden of directors. See Kyogaku Baisho, supra note 136.
145. See Kyogaku Baisho, supra note 136. One insurer indicated to me that his company's increase in D&O premiums for existing customers was in the range of 10-20%
and that insurance premiums for new customers represented an additional increase in
the same range of 10-20%. This is quite substantial and, of course, only represents
additional coverage that the insurance company was willing and able to provide. A substantial number of requests for coverage were also declined. Due to the sudden surge of
requests for coverage following the Daiwa Bank Case, insurance companies did not need
any marketing strategy to take advantage of changed perceptions; rather they were preoccupied with trying to meet the new demand for coverage from both existing and new
customers. Interview with Takumi Matsumae, Deputy Manager, Tokyo Marine & Fire
Insurance Co. Ltd., in Tokyo, Japan (June 10, 2002).

2003

Japanese Corporate Governance

demand quickly overwhelmed the capacity of the Japanese insurance
industry to provide coverage.
The industry was overwhelmed because in order to avoid unhedged
risk Japanese insurance companies underwrite D&O coverage only to the
extent that they can obtain appropriate reinsurance. However, during the
period following the Daiwa Bank Case, the capacity of the reinsurance
industry, which is centered in the United States and Europe, was contracting due to numerous claims arising from the bankruptcy of dot-com
companies. This trend only worsened following the September eleventh
terrorist attack. 1 46 The result was that numerous requests for D&O coverage by Japanese companies could not be met by the Japanese insurance
14 7
industry in the Daiwa Bank Case's aftermath.
D.

Legislative Response to the Daiwa Bank Case and the Debate on
Corporate Governance
Outraged reaction to the Daiwa Bank Case by business groups resuscitated
a prior industry-sponsored proposal, 148 which resulted in a new amendment to the Japanese Commercial Code in December of 2001 (the "Amendment") aimed at limiting directors' liability in shareholder derivative suits
and increasing the independence of statutory auditors. 149 The Amendment contrasts with the broader approach in a separate overhaul of Japan's
146. An increase in securities-fraud litigation, related primarily to dot-com companies, is also cited as the primary cause of a substantial increase in rates for D&O coverage in the U.S. During 2001-2002, rates increased 25-40% for financially sound
companies. In addition, Reliance Group Holdings, Inc., the sixth largest underwriter of
D&O insurance in 1999, went bankrupt. See Christopher Oster, When the Boss Caused

the Loss, Who Pays?: 'D&O' InsuranceIs Supposed to Cover Management Mistakes, but Not
if Insurer Is in Trouble Too, WALL Si. J., June 13, 2002, at C1.
147. Reinsurers allocated their capacity among Japanese insurers with whom they
had relationships; Japanese insurers, in turn, allocated D&O coverage among their
existing and new customers. A manager from Mitsui Marine & Fire, relating how he
contacted a London reinsurer in an attempt to obtain additional D&O coverage, is
quoted as saying, "[m]aybe they were surprised by the Daiwa Bank Case decision. They
were very cautious and their response was stingy." See Kyogaku Baisho, supra note 136.
As a result, when insureds requested large increases in coverage, they were told that
"[flor 10 billion yen or more of coverage, we cannot underwrite it except for important
customers." Id.
148. See Keizai Dantai Rengokai, K6por~to Gabanansu Tokubetsu linkai, K6por~to
Gabanansu no Arikata ni kansuru Kinkyfi Teigen [Corporate Governance Special Committee, Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, Emergency Proposal regarding the
Form of Corporate Governance] (Sept. 10, 1997), reprinted in 1468 SHojI HOMU 30
(1997). Keidanren's website offers an English translation, Urgent Recommendations Concerning Corporate Governance, available at http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/
pol067.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
149. See Shoho oyobi Kabushiki Gaisha no Kansato ni kansuru Shoho no Tokurei ni
kansuru Horitsu no lchibu wo Kaisei suru Horitsuan [Bill to Amend a Portion of the
Commercial Code and Act Regarding Special Rules of the Commercial Code Concerning
Auditing, etc., of Stock Corporations], reprinted in 1614 SHOJI HOMU 5 (2001). This bill
and a complementary bill were introduced on May 20, 2001 as a Diet (Parliament) member's bill as opposed to the bulk of legislation, which is sponsored by the government.
Upon deliberation that fall, the ruling coalition accepted certain opposition-proposed
amendments and the Lower House passed the bills on November 29, 2001. The Upper
House passed the bills as amended on December 5, 2001.
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Commercial Code enacted in May 2002 (the "Overhaul"), which provides,
among other measures, for an increased role for outside directors and an
optional provision that enables Japanese companies to adopt an "Ameri150
can-style" board system in order to improve corporate governance.
These amendments, both the products of political compromise, are the first
steps in an ongoing debate over corporate governance. The method
selected to achieve management oversight, i.e., the traditional means of
statutory auditors or "American-style" means of independent directors and
board committees, will have a profound impact on the fundamental future
direction of corporate governance in Japan.
The Amendment provides for exculpatory charter provisions limiting
the amount of directors' liability for damages based on the director's compensation and sets forth a corresponding procedure for an after-the-fact
release of directors from liability. 151 However, both provisions require consent of the statutory auditors and shareholder approval, 1 5 2 Further, the
Amendment excludes cases involving a knowing violation of law, bad faith,
or gross negligence from both the exculpatory charter provision and the
release provision.
These limitations on the Amendment's application may reflect its origin, as a proposal by business groups that originally asked for, among
other matters, a codification of a Japanese version of the business judgment rule. 1 53 The limitations may also be the result of initial resistance by
the political opposition parties and considerable opposition by some legal
commentators. 5 4 Industry groups only agreed with this limited approach
150. See infra note 156.
151. The Amendment provides for maximum liability of six years' compensation for
representative directors, four years for other inside directors and two years for outside
directors. Proponents of the Amendment asserted that a limit on directors' liability
related to annual compensation followed "U.S. law," as the ALl permits charter provisions which reduce directors' and officers' liability to one year's compensation, but does
not permit the complete elimination of such liability. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.19 (1994). However, the vast
majority of states in the United States have adopted director protection statutes based on
Delaware law and the Model Business Corporation Act, which do not involve dollar limits on directors' liability. Opponents of the Amendment also cited U.S. law for their own
purposes. See infra note 154.
152. The exculpatory provision to limit directors' liability to a maximum based on
said director's compensation requires a special (i.e., two-thirds) resolution of shareholders. If the board of directors passes a resolution for an after-the-fact release of a director
from liability, shareholders holding 3 % of the company's shares may object to the
board's action. The Amendment also seeks to make the statutory auditors more independent by, among other measures, providing that for large corporations at least half of
the statutory auditors must be outside auditors.
153. That is essentially what the Amendment provides. Accordingly, it does not go as
far as Delaware's exculpatory charter provision. It is also questionable whether such a
provision, if it had been in effect, would have affected the outcome in the Daiwa Bank
Case since the court's decision would presumably have found liability even under a
standard of gross negligence. Kabunushi Daihyo Sosho: Torishimariyaku no Baisho ni
Jogen [Shareholder Derivative Litigation: Upper Limit on Directors' Damages], NIHON
KEIZAI SHINBUN, Nov. 23, 2001.
154. According to this view, the Daiwa Bank Case, like Van Gorhom, is a highly unusual decision that is unlikely to be repeated. There were three basic grounds for opposi-
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after they received assurances that it was only the first step in a series of
155
measures designed to address industry concerns.
In contrast to the specific goals and fairly narrow focus of the Amendment, the Japanese government also began an effort to carry out the first
major overhaul of the Commercial Code in over fifty years. An advisory
panel to the Ministry of Justice published an interim draft in April of 2001,
which culminated in enactment of the Overhaul in May of 2002.156
Although neither comprehensive nor even wholly consistent, the Overhaul
departs from past practice and approaches corporate law in a spirit that is
157
more enabling than mandatory.
The heart of the Overhaul's corporate governance section essentially
creates a new optional "American-style" system of corporate governance. ' 58
It calls for the creation of three board committees: an audit committee, a
nominating committee, and a compensation committee, as well as for the
introduction of a system of executive officers.1 59 Application of the section
would result in the separation of directors and officers and the elimination
of the two important German-inspired features of Japanese corporate lawtion to the Amendment: (1) that the Delaware exculpatory charter provision primarily
protects outside directors, not insiders as under the Amendment; (2) any limitations on
director liability, for example for outside directors, should be left to the courts; and (3)
the Amendment's focus on statutory auditors as a method of improving Japanese corporate governance is misguided and counterproductive. See generally Kabunushi Daihyo
Sosho Seido Kenkyukai [Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System Study Group], 1605
SHOJI HOMU 36 (Part I) (2001); Kabunoshi Daihyo sosho oyobi Kansayaku Seido ni hansuru
Shohoto Kaisei Hoan ni taisuru Iken [Opinion on Bill to Amend the Commercial Code
concerning Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Statutory Auditor System, etc.],
1606 SHoJI HOMU 17 (Part II) (2001).
The characterization of the Delaware exculpatory charter provision as primarily protecting outside directors would not be readily accepted in the United States. Delaware
law protects director's actions "as a director," as opposed to an executive function,
regardless of whether the director in question is an inside or outside director. The
group's point, however, derives from a strong concern for encouraging the use of outside
directors and a belief that they are the group worthy of special protection to limit their
liability. As discussed previously, Japanese courts tend to examine directors' liability in
the context of each director's line, or executive responsibilities. See sources cited supra
note 96 and accompanying text. In the Japanese context, protection of a director's
actions as a "director" may be viewed as affording greater protection to outside directors
who have no line responsibilities.
155. Interview with Shinsaku Iwahara, Professor, University of Tokyo Faculty of Law,
in Tokyo, Japan (June 3, 2002).
156. See Homu Sho Minjikyoku Sanjikanshitsu [Councellors' Office, Civil Bureau,
Ministry ofJustice], Shohoto no Ichibu wo Kaisei suru Horitsuan Yk6 Chukan Shian [Outline of Interim Draft of Bill to Amend a Portion of the Commercial Code, etc.] (Apr. 18,
2001), reprinted in 1206 JURISTO 165 (2001).
157. The bill to enact the Overhaul was divided into four major sections, stock (corporate finance), corporate organs (governance), corporate accounting-disclosure, and other
(including electronic meetings and reporting and foreign corporations). Unlike prior
revisions to the Commercial Code after 1950, it is not a focused response to a specific
scandal or problem. Rather, it constitutes the first attempt in Japan to deal with the
question of what is the most appropriate form of corporate governance for Japanese
corporations.
158. See Shoho oyobi Kabushiki Gaisha, supra note 149.
159. Id.
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the representative director and statutory auditor. A representative officer
with authority to bind the corporation would replace the representative
director, and directors serving on the audit committee would replace the
160
statutory auditors.
However, there is far from unanimous agreement that this or any other
proposal represents the best form of corporate governance for Japanese
corporations. 16 1 Significantly, the Overhaul is completely silent concerning the function of statutory auditors, and its only improvement in corporate governance for corporations which choose to retain that system is a
largely symbolic requirement that each large corporation must have at least
one outside director.162 Japanese companies are moving forward to meet
this outside director requirement. However, early indications suggest that
they remain very cautious about adopting the "American-style" board system, which despite its benefits (such as greater board control over corporate finance) theoretically cedes control over fundamental personnel issues
163
(such as the appointment and compensation of directors) to outsiders.
Those opposed to the "American-style" board defend the existing statutory
auditor system 164 and are concerned with extending the same benefits to
corporations that continue using the previously existing form of corporate
governance. It is also quite possible that Japanese corporate governance
160. See Homu Sho Minjikyoku Sanjikanshitsu, Shohoto no Ichibu wo Kaisei suru
Horitsuan YOkO Chukan Shian no Kaisetsu [Councellors' Office, Civil Bureau, Ministry of
Justice, Commentary on the Outline of Interim Draft of Bill to Amend a Portion of the
Commercial Code, etc.] (Apr. 18, 2001), reprinted in 1206 JURISTO 184, 195 (2001).
161. Accordingly, the Overhaul sets forth one new corporate governance structure
that may be adopted by corporations. Companies are also free to retain their current
structure. There appears to be fairly widespread agreement that corporations should be
allowed some flexibility in choosing the most appropriate form of corporate governance.
Under this enabling approach, the role of corporate law would be to provide an appropriate "menu" of legitimate alternatives that each corporation could adapt to its own
circumstances and needs.
162. The commentary to the Overhaul bill notes that there was an opinion that all
large corporations should be required to adopt the new "American-style" system, but that
this question was left for further study.
163. For example, one early survey of one thousand Japanese companies conducted
by the Japan Auditors Association found that over half of the companies had determined
to maintain the current statutory auditor system, while only four had decided to switch
to the "American-style" system. Beikokukei Keiei Keitai Kano ni: Sangyokai, Donyu ni
Shincho [American-style Management System is made Possible: Industry is Cautious
about its Introduction], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, May 23, 2002, at 4.

164. The main argument of the system's defenders is that since there is no widely
accepted "best" system of corporate governance, the main issue is one of transparency
and disclosure, i.e., to better define and disclose governance institutions and their functions, for example, the identities and roles of statutory auditors and any outside directors, in each corporation. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 17 (Speaker:
Kanda). Conversely, one interviewee stressed that given the general lack of corporate
disclosure in Japan, as a practical matter, it would be difficult for outsiders to obtain
ongoing access to the necessary information in order to act as an effective check on
management. Interview with Kuniyuki Suda, Statutory Auditor, Tokyo Marine & Fire
Co., Ltd., in Tokyo, Japan (June 10, 2002). In his view statutory auditors are provided
sufficient tools under the Commercial Code to act as an effective check on management,
but whether those powers are in fact exercised so as to provide an effective audit function depends on the internal environment of each company. Id.
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will become bifurcated, with a sophisticated minority of public companies
adopting the new committee system in order to attract foreign investors,
while the majority of companies retain the existing statutory auditor
system. 165
Reconsidering the Importance of Law in Japanese Corporate
Governance
The legal issues and role of the legal system represented by the Daiwa Bank
Case necessitate the reexamination of our views of the role of law in Japan,
particularly with respect to corporate governance. The Daiwa Bank Case
and its aftermath, which highlight extensive consideration in Japan of the
merits of "American-style" corporate governance, also provide a basis for
considering the question of the convergence of corporate governance
systems.
V.

A.

Implications of the Daiwa Bank Case

The Daiwa Bank Case and its aftermath highlight numerous issues relating
to the role of law and corporate governance practices which are not
addressed by the internal monitoring model of Japanese corporate governance. The Daiwa Bank Case makes clear that the board of directors must
take seriously the supervisory function assigned to it in Japan's Commercial Code. In terms of legal doctrine, directors not only have a duty of
oversight, they are now obligated to take board action to establish overall
policies for internal controls and compliance with law, and to oversee the
creation and implementation of the various components of overall policies.
This emphasis on the board of directors providing an independent check
on management and taking positive action to assume the lead in formulating and implementing policies goes well beyond what has generally been
viewed as the role of the board of directors under Japanese corporate
governance.
The same can be said with respect to the court's approach to compliance with the law. At first glance, the results of the Daiwa Bank Case might
appear quite harsh for several reasons. First, the extent of individual director's liability was based on foreign laws not specifically known by the directors. Second, this violation of foreign law resulted in a huge damage award
based on U.S. criminal procedures and practice. As noted above, Japan
does not have a general doctrine of vicarious liability. Similarly, although
it is perhaps unsurprising that administrative guidance was not recognized
as an independent defense to an accusation of violation of law, it is striking
that the court would not give it any consideration as an extenuating cir165. Recent surveys indicate that some thirty Japanese companies have announced
their intention to switch to the board committee system. See Mariko Ando, Japan Firms
Boost Corp. Governance, CBS Market Watch, Mar. 19, 2003. A group of internationally
oriented Japanese companies may emerge that view improvements in corporate governance as a plus in attracting shareholders, particularly foreign shareholders. See, e.g.,
Neil A. Martin, Shareholder-San:Japanese Insurer Nipponkoa Is a Poster Boy for WesternStyle Corporate Governance, BARRON'S, Feb. 24, 2003, at 30.
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cumstance. Indeed, as discussed earlier, the court goes on to castigate the
defendants by characterizing the defendants' reliance on administrative
guidance as an abandonment of their duties as directors to make independent business judgments in the best interests of the corporation.
On the institutional side, the role of shareholder derivative suits and
courts in the Daiwa Bank Case is also striking. An effective shareholder
derivative suit system was thought to be inconsistent with traditional Japanese practices, and Japanese businesses were greatly surprised by the
increase in derivative suits after 1993. The Daiwa Bank Case itself played
an important role in opening up the system by rejecting defendants'
demand for security for expenses in a preliminary ruling. The limitations
on director liability under the Amendment's codification of the business
judgment rule are substantially less than those established under Delaware
law following Van Gorkom, and shareholder derivative suits could continue
to be highly significant. As in Caremark,judges sometimes make decisions
to change or extend existing law in light of changing legal and social conditions. The Daiwa Bank court's choosing such a path indicates an educational role in mandating change in corporate governance practices which
challenges the image of Japanese courts and judges as being both cautious
and supportive of business.
In terms of corporate governance practices, one is struck both by the
enhanced prospective role of lawyers and by the vigorous debate on corporate governance issues. In the fact pattern of the Daiwa Bank Case lawyers
are noticeable chiefly by their absence-in keeping, perhaps, with traditional corporate practices in Japan, but leading to disastrous results for several of the defendants in the court's decision. Although it remains to be
seen whether the Daiwa Bank Case will become a "full employment law for
lawyers" it appears that the court's decision will provide a boost to the
underlying trend of lawyers participating more actively in the formulation
of corporate policies and board decisions.
Meanwhile, responses to the Daiwa Bank Case included an explosion
in demand for D&O insurance and legislation to limit directors' liability.
There is active and well-informed debate in Japan concerning the optimal
form(s) of corporate governance. However, rather than mandatory government-imposed rules which might elicit compliance in form only, the
approach under the post-Daiwa Bank Overhaul is that legal rules should
both be flexible and correspond to the realities of adopting improved corporate government practices.
The Daiwa Bank court's finding of directors' liability has already
resulted in serious consideration being given, perhaps for the first time, to
the standard of liability for directors. Despite the controversy surrounding
the Daiwa Bank Case, the fundamental matters discussed by the court,
including a directors' duty for internal controls and compliance policies,
are here to stay. Further, the restrictions on derivative suits in the Amendment represent exactly the kind of discussion about directors' duties and
business judgments with which American lawyers would feel quite famil-
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iar-they seem out of place under the prevalent view of corporate governance in Japan which emphasizes informality over the rule of law.
The far-reaching impact of the Daiwa Bank Case was partly due to
underlying trends involving the role of law in Japanese corporate governance during the 1990s. The increase in derivative suits and the first plaintiffs' victories provided a base for the development of both legal doctrine
and the derivative suit system. Following the collapse of the bubble economy, corporations were already gradually reforming corporate governance
practices and relying more on outside counsel. Most listed companies had
already begun to obtain limited amounts of D&O insurance coverage.
Industry groups had already proposed legislation codifying the business
judgment rule and limiting directors' liability. The Daiwa Bank Case
greatly accelerated and broadened these underlying trends.
The above discussion points to a need to rethink the generally
accepted internal monitoring model of Japanese corporate governance.
The Daiwa Bank Case highlights the progress of ongoing changes in Japan,
which indicate the increasing importance of formal legal checks and balances, more of an independent function for the board of directors, an
increased emphasis on "American-style" internal controls and compliance
with law in Japanese corporations, as well as a greater external check on
management activities by means of shareholders' suits. While it is unlikely
that Japan will-or would want to-look like American society, it does
appear that the dominant view of Japanese corporate governance fails to
account for the dynamic changes occurring in Japan.
B. Convergence Theory and the Traditional Borrowing Process
The discussion of the landmark Daiwa Bank Case and its aftermath,
together with the broader fundamental debate on corporate governance,
raises issues concerning Japanese corporate governance and convergence
theory. Views on convergence theory were a contributing factor in the formulation of the widely accepted internal monitoring model of Japanese
corporate governance. This is also particularly relevant in light of the Japanese penchant for studying American and other foreign legal systems, and
the numerous references in this Article to the Japanese consideration or
adoption of "American-style" corporate governance practices.
The convergence debate is not only of great intellectual interest. It
also potentially has enormous practical significance for transitional economies that are engaged in formulating and constructing their legal and economic institutions. However, there are a number of reservations
concerning how far convergence theory advances our understanding of the
relationship between legal systems and economic development, particularly when one turns to the evaluation of governance institutions in specific national systems.
First, comparisons of corporate governance systems tend to be influenced by underlying assumptions or value judgments concerning which is
the "best" or "model" system. Views on which system is the proper "model"
may change over time depending on the economic performance and per-
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ceived "success" of various countries.' 66 Proponents of the "law matters"
theory try to overcome such potential biases by offering comparative
empirical evidence to demonstrate that a strong "rule of law," particularly
protection for minority shareholders, correlates with strong and efficient
capital markets. However, even in the United States, where there are fewer
and more certain variables, there is no clear evidence linking corporate
governance with economic performance. 16 7 International comparisons
which necessitate relying on even cruder variables and assumptions would
seem even more difficult.
A second reservation is the tendency to oversimplify governance systems into static "idealized" models, such as the "Anglo-Saxon" model and
the "European/Japanese" model, which can readily be used to make broad
international comparisons. However, the United States has experienced
significant changes during the 1980s and 1990s in the direction of greater
emphasis on shareholder sovereignty and transparent markets. 168 Perceptions also change. For example, it is also clear in the post-Enron era that
some of the changes in the United States during the 1990s which were
designed to promote the maximization of shareholder wealth, such as the
great increase in the award of stock options to management, have had the
perverse effect of disaligning management's interests from those of shareholders. Conversely, significant changes have occurred in Japan, including
a substantial dismantling of the cross-shareholding structure which was
thought to support the internal monitoring model of Japanese corporate
governance, seemingly without affecting the "classification" of Japan under
the broad scheme employed by proponents of convergence theory.
166. Organizations like the OECD, which seek to improve corporate governance by
promulgating common principles with broad applicability, explicitly deny that there is
any single "best" system or set of practices. It also appears that international lending
organizations like the IMF, given weaker economic performance in the United States and
a vocal reaction from their critics, have begun to retreat from their strong advocacy of
U.S.-style corporate governance through the "rule of law," which was prevalent in the
1990s.
167. For a broad review of the existing empirical studies in the United States, see
Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition
and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAWYER 921 (1999). With respect to these U.S. studies,
one commentator notes that "the variables become so numerous as to make the subject
impossible to study." Hamilton, supra note 8, at 365. Hamilton further notes that "studies limited to the impact of corporate governance changes on increases in shareholder
wealth involve significant problems and assumptions. To broaden the study further is
simply impractical." Id. Although the empirical studies by La Porta et al. seek to measure much broader matters, it seems that the same concerns would be applicable. Evaluation of the empirical studies also depends on how narrowly and literally one views the
findings; the authors of the studies seem more aware of their limitations than some
others who cite the studies. See La Porta et al., supra note 17.
168. Some would say that the theory of shareholder sovereignty in the United States
has become a reality only during this recent period. This, again, constitutes an idealized
view of American corporate governance. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (as
noted in the Introduction, this applies only to large public corporations). Even for large
corporations, there is still considerable debate about the reality. See generally Hamilton,
supra note 8. In addition, the corporate laws of some states specifically authorize directors to consider the interests of constituencies other than shareholders. See id. at n.38.
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Third, there may be alternative explanations for recent global developments. There is little doubt that the general goal of maximizing shareholder wealth has become more widely accepted, 16 9 and in a broad sense
all developed countries and many transitional economies appear to be moving in a similar direction as the importance of direct finance, as represented by the equity and debt markets, has increased significantly relative
to indirect forms of corporate finance. However, this could simply be the
result of parallel changes initiated in response to the same postindustrial
phenomena, such as deregulation, globalization, and technological development, rather than convergence. In addition, many countries outside the
United States place a greater emphasis on the social role of corporations, as
corporate governance systems are not solely a matter of law and economics.17 0 Corporate governance systems have broad social implications and
any country contemplating change would obviously work to adapt principles or models that conform to its local institutions and value systems. 171
A consideration of Japan helps to illustrate the discussion above. U.S.
practices have undoubtedly significantly influenced recent Japanese thinking concerning corporate governance. Yet, the Japanese are still cautious;
they regard the argument that the form of corporate governance relates to
business performance or has other economic benefits as unproven. They
also doubt both the existence of any particular optimal form of corporate
governance and the wisdom of legally imposing a particular set of practices
on Japanese corporations. Despite widespread acknowledgement of the
necessity for change, some Japanese still believe that the emphasis should
instead be on greater transparency and disclosure regardless of the particular institutional arrangements relating to corporate governance. In this
light, it may be useful to view forms of corporate governance on a continuum, with the Japanese recognizing the desirability of placing greater
emphasis on shareholder primacy within the context of their legal structure and governance institutions.
In turn, this suggests that the traditional borrowing process is relevant
to convergence theory. The current situation in Japan suggests that
changes in many areas may be occurring simultaneously in response to
changed economic circumstances and the dismal failure of Japan's economic and other policies in the 1990s. It also suggests that behind the
debate on "convergence" may lay a fairly traditional pattern of borrowing,
whereby Japan, for example, may look to a country with prior experiences
in a particular problem area, such as the United States, with the purpose of
169. Although, perhaps, not to the extent argued by its most enthusiastic proponents.
See Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
170. In many countries outside the United States, such as Japan, Dodd is still discussed on a relatively equal footing with Berle-Means. See, e.g., AKIRA MORITA, KAISHAHO
NO KISEI KANWA TO KOPOR(TO GABANNASU [Enabling Corporate Code and Corporate Governance] 23-43 (2000) (distinguishing Berle's focus on shareholders from Dodd's focus

on society).
171. A number of thoughtful commentators on convergence theory have raised this
point. See generally Gilson, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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finding useful approaches or concepts and adapting them to fit its own
72

needs. 1

The Daiwa Bank Case and its aftermath provide a good illustration of
this process. A new director's duty of oversight for internal controls and
compliance with law was formulated within the Japanese courts' existing
framework of examining liability based primarily on a director's supervision over a particular business department. Additionally, new legislation
codifies the "American-style" business judgment rule, while monitoring
management by strengthening the German-inspired institution of independently functioning statutory auditors that has no U.S. counterpart. Other
legislation enables, but does not require, Japanese corporations to adopt a
"U.S.-style" governance system featuring independent directors and board
committees.
Despite the substantial and growing literature on convergence theory,
this Article's examination of Japanese efforts to close the gap between the
theory and practice of corporate law highlights the difficulties inherent in
analyzing governance-related institutions in a rapidly changing environment in a way that lends itself to meaningful comparisons with other systems. The Japanese example suggests caution in applying convergence
theory so that it serves in aiding analysis of governance systems, rather
than unintentionally hindering our ability to analyze and appreciate ongoing changes within them.
Conclusion
The role of law in Japan, which was largely overlooked in the traditional
view of Japanese society, is in the process of assuming far greater importance due to significant changes in Japan. A crisis may be necessary for
drastic change, and Japan now has one. It has become the conventional
wisdom in Japan that the country is now undergoing its third great modernizing transformation, following those of the Meiji restoration in the
19th century and the immediate post-World War II era. It may be that the
ultimate extent of such change-including both the role of law generally
and reliance on the newly emerging forms of corporate governance in particular-will not be fully tested until Japan experiences a sustained economic recovery. However, as measured by the rulings in the Daiwa Bank
Case and its aftermath, the ferment in Japanese corporate governance is
real and is likely to continue.
At this stage, the degree of "real change" in Japan remains open to
question. All the debate over appropriate forms of corporate governance
172. Although this borrowing process has a long history, discussion of legal "transplants" is also encumbered with its own intellectual baggage, including the underlying
assumption that certain advanced societies act as "donors" in providing laws to be transplanted to "recipient" societies. For a discussion of this point in relation to Japan, see,
for example, ERIc A.

FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN

145 -48 (2000). In fact, in

recent years Japan, which has typically been viewed as a recipient nation, has embarked
on an ambitious donor program by providing technical legal assistance to a number of
transitional economies in Southeast and Central Asia.
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has not produced a widely accepted new model of corporate governance.
Nevertheless, the change is real; it would surely be difficult today to find a
Japanese executive who felt comfortable focusing only on informal relationships with his main bank, keiretsu, and government ministry, while
ignoring the formal legal duties of board members, derivative suits, D&O
insurance, lawyers, and compliance with law.
The five-year history of the Daiwa Bank Case (from criminal prosecution in the United States to liability in a shareholder derivative suit in
Japan) itself provides a roadmap for the significant changes occurring in
Japan. The dramatic beginnings of the case in New York first highlighted
the importance of internal controls and compliance with law for Japanese
banks and regulators. These represented new issues, such as policies and
procedures to prevent and detect employee wrongdoing and to ensure compliance with laws, which were not adequately addressed by prior Japanese
practices. Within five years these new concepts were sufficiently accepted
in Japan to the point that the Daiwa Bank court enunciated them as legal
duties and found liability of several directors for violating them. In hindsight, the Daiwa Bank Case will perhaps provide a milestone or dividing
line demarcating the "traditional" behavior of the bank in this case and an
increased emphasis on law in Japanese corporate governance as exemplified by the court's emphasis on the legal duties of directors. The case and
its aftermath dramatically highlight an underlying trend of the increasing
role of the formal legal system in corporate governance and, in turn, both
reinforce and expand such a trend.
The Daiwa Bank Case also provides evidence of a shareholder derivative system functioning to a surprising degree like the U.S. system during
the transformation of the American corporate governance model during
the 1980s. The derivative lawsuit system, specifically the potential for
"big" cases to be transmitted through and amplified by the formal legal
system and exert an impact on corporate practices, is arguably the least
likely element of the U.S. transformation to appear in Japan under current
theory. We must reconsider theories of comparative corporate law in order
to account for changes occurring in Japanese corporate governance and the
new importance of law in Japan.

